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CRIMINAL

LAW-POST-SUBMISSION JUROR SUBSTITUTION IN THE THIRD

CIRCUIT:

SERVING JUDICIAL ECONOMY WHILE UNDERMINING A

DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY UNDER RULE 24(c)
I.

INTRODUCTION

At common law, courts would discharge a juror and declare a mistrial
if he or she became incapacitated or disqualified during a criminal trial.'
This practice resulted in a substantial expenditure of resources by the
prosecution, defense and court. 2 Losses were especially acute where the
3
trial had already extended for a considerable period of time.
1. SeeJoshua G. Grunat, Note, Post-Submission Substitution of AlternateJurors in
Federal Criminal Cases: Effects of Violations of FederalRules of Criminal Procedure23(b)
and 24(c), 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 861, 861 (1987) (discussing how mistrial declared in
criminal case when juror became incapacitated after jury was impaneled); Douglas
J. McDermott, Note, Substitution of Alternate Jurors During Deliberationsand Implications on the Rights of Litigants: The Reginald Denny Tria4 35 B.C. L. REV. 847, 847
(1994) (same); David Paul Nicoli, Note, FederalRules of CriminalProcedure 23(b) and
24(c): A Proposalto Reduce MistrialsDue to IncapacitatedJurors, 31 AM. U. L. REv. 651,
651 (1981) (commenting that "when a juror in a criminal trial became incapacitated by illness or death, or for other reasons after the jury was impaneled, the
proper procedure was to declare a mistrial and begin de novo by forming a new
jury").
Jurors are discharged when they can no longer serve on the jury because they
are mentally or physically ill. See, e.g., Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1574 (3d
Cir. 1995) (upholding discharge ofjuror because he became ill after six and onehalf hours of deliberations), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1329 (1996); Peek v. Kemp, 784
F.2d 1479, 1482-85 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (upholding discharge ofjuror because of extreme nervousness); United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1055-57
(2d Cir. 1983) (upholding discharge ofjuror when juror became ill after two and
one-half days of deliberations and three-day holiday recess); United States v.
Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565, 565-68 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (upholding removal ofjuror upon
recommendation of psychiatrist during deliberations after about six months of
trial).
When a juror cannot deliberate with an open mind, a court will "disqualify"
and discharge the juror. See, e.g., United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th
Cir. 1985) (finding juror unqualified because she had trouble hearing during
trial); United States v. Barker, 735 F.2d 1280, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding
juror unqualified because she touched defendant's arm and smiled at him).
2. See McDermott, supra note 1, at 847 (discussing substantial expenditures
caused by mistrials at common law); see also FED. R. CRiM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 298-301 (1983) (discussing solution to substantial expenditures of legal resources). In 1983, the Advisory Committee for the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure reviewed an amendment to Rule 23 (b) allowing for
the validity of 1-member jury verdicts to be in the discretion of the judge in cases
where a juror had been excused. Id. at 245, 297-301. The committee was concerned with the "fair and efficient administration ofjustice" in these difficult situations. Id. at 298.
3. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 298 (discussing problems arising ifjuror is lost after deliberations commence). The Advisory Committee admitted that the removal of jurors after the beginning of
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To alleviate the problems associated with mistrials, the Supreme
Court and Congress adopted Rules 23(b) and 24(c) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. 4 Both rules approach these problems in unique
ways. Rule 24(c) allows a judge to replace one of the original jurors with
an alternate juror prior to deliberation. 5 Rule 23(b) allows ajudge to use
his or her discretion on whether to continue with only eleven jurors, without needing to obtain the permission of either the defense or
6
prosecution.
Even though the directives of Rules 23(b) and 24(c) are clear, many
federal courts have continued to disregard the rules and have adopted
their own procedures to deal with these post-submission substitution of
juror cases. 7 Some courts will allow alternates to sit in on the deliberation
process in case one of the original jurors becomes incapacitated or disqualified. 8 Other courts sequester alternate jurors separately until the
deliberations did not "occur with great frequency," but it presented a difficult
problem when it did appear. Id.
4. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289, 337-45 (1981). Rules 23(b) and 24(c) were
adopted in response to this problem in 1946 and 23(b) was later amended in 1983.
See generally FED. R. CuM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 298-301
(discussing amendment to Rule 23(b) as solution to post-submission juror substitution after deliberations begin); Lester B. Orfield, TrialJurors in Federal Criminal
Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43 (1962) [hereinafter Orfield, TrialJurors] (discussing history of
Rule 24 in response to mistrials from discharge ofjurors); Lester B. Orfield, Trial
by Jury in FederalCriminalProcedure,1962 DuKE LJ. 29 (discussing history of Rule 23
as response to mistrials from discharge of jurors).
5. FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(c). Rule 24(c) provides: "[A]lternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury
retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to
perform their duties." Id. In addition, Rule 24(c) provides: "Alternate jurors shall
be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject
to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have
the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors." Id.
6. FED. R. CaM. P. 23(b). For a further discussion of the amendments to Rule
23(b), see infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the improvised procedures federal courts use when deciding post-submission substitution cases, see infra notes 8-10, 79-121 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993) (allowing presence of silent alternates during deliberations because defense counsel failed to
object to their presence and defendants not prejudiced), cert. denied, 17 S. Ct. 303
(1996); Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 126 (7th Cir. 1981) (allowing alternate to attend but not participate in jury deliberations); United States v. Allison,
481 F.2d 468, 470-72 (5th Cir. 1973) (allowing sit-in procedure when parties agree
to stipulation); La-Tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Div., 444 F.2d 1366, 1367
(5th Cir. 1971) (allowing alternate to be present during deliberation because both
counsels consented). But see, e.g., United States v. Ottersburg, 76 F.3d 137, 139
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that allowing two alternate jurors to sit-in on deliberations and to sign verdict form was reversible error); United States v. Chatman, 584
F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding reversible error is present when trial
court allows alternate's presence in deliberation room); United States v. Beasley,
464 F.2d 468, 470-71 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding mistrial was necessary when alternate observed deliberations and helped select foreperson); United States v. Vir-
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original twelve jurors have completed deliberations. 9 Finally, a number of
courts continue to permit the post-submission substitution of alternate jurors after the jury begins deliberations. 10
Thus, there is a building trend in our federal system for courts to
implement their own procedures to sidestep Rule 24(c)'s mandatory discharge of alternate jurors after deliberations begin" l and Rule 24's prohibition against post-submission substitution of jurors.' 2 Currently, the
circuit courts appear to disagree over whether a clear violation of 24(c)
13
amounts to a reversible error in all cases.
ginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 871-72 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding reversible
error occurs when district court permitted alternate to retire with jury to observe
deliberations).
9. See, e.g., Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1574 (3d Cir. 1995) (permitting
alternate jurors to be separately sequestered), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1329 (1996);
United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 799 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); United States v.
Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1983) (allowing two alternates to be separately sequestered during deliberations); United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944,
950 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding retention of alternate jurors did not prejudice
defendant).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 1992)
(allowing juror substitution after deliberations because defendant was not
prejudiced); United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
defendant was not prejudiced by post-submission substitution when defendant expressly demanded that alternate be impaneled rather than continue with only 11
jurors); Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1485 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (holding
defendant suffered no prejudice by post-submission substitution); Miller v.
Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding post-submission substitution
procedure because it "preserved the 'essential feature' of the jury"); United States
v.Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587-88 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding post-submission substitution of jurors permissible when defendant not prejudiced); Hillard, 701 F.2d at
1061 (holding post-submission substitution is permissible when efforts are taken to
ensure that defendant is not prejudiced); United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d 1124,
1127-28 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding post-submission substitution procedure because prejudicial effect was eliminated by defendant's consent and absence during
previous deliberations); Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1980) (allowing juror substitution after deliberations if "essential feature of the jury was
preserved"); United States v. Baccari, 489 F.2d 274, 275 (10th Cir. 1973) (upholding post-submission substitution because defendant consented and knowingly
waived any objections); Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1966)
(holding post-submission substitution is permissible if defendant suffers no prejudice and defendant knowingly consents). But see United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d
1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding post-submission substitution impermissible if
defendant does not consent to procedure).
11. For a review of cases that violate rule 24(c)'s mandatory discharge of alternate jurors once deliberations begin, see supra notes 8-10 and infra notes 79-121
and accompanying text.
12. See Grunat, supra note 1, at 863-64 (commenting that many courts now
allow post-submission substitution); McDermott, supra note 1, at 848 (discussing
how increasing number of courts create post-submission procedures in violation of
Rule 24(c)). For a review of cases that violate Rule 24(c)'s prohibition against
post-submission substitution, see supra note 10 and infra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion about the debate among the circuits over post-submission
substitution, see infra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
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Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Claudio v. Snyder,14 held that post-submission substitutions are permissible
if the defendant is not prejudiced by the substitution and the "essential
feature" of the jury is preserved. 1 5 Claudiohas special significance because
it presented a question of first impression in the Third Circuit. 16 The
Court reasoned that post-submission substitution of alternates does not
violate a defendant's right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments if the court's instructions to the newly formed jury acts as
the "functional equivalent" of instructing the jury to begin deliberations
again. 17 In addition, the Third Circuit held that reversal is not required as
long as the substitution of the alternate juror does not compromise the
"essential feature" of a trial by jury.18
This Casebrief argues that the Third Circuit's judicially improvised
post-submission substitution procedure promotes judicial economy and efficiency, but endangers the defendant's right to a trial by jury under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part I of this Casebrief reviews the
importance of the jury system and deliberation process in the American
legal system. 19 Part II discusses the development of Rules 24(c) and
23(b). 20 Next, Part III reviews the various approaches to post-submission
substitution in the federal system. 2 ' Part IV analyzes the Third Circuit's
view of post-submission substitution in ClaudioY2 Part V explains how the
Third Circuit's ruling has compromised the sanctity and impartiality of the
jury deliberation process. 23 Finally, Part VI recommends how attorneys in
24
the Third Circuit should proceed in the future.
14. 68 F.3d 1573 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1329 (1996).
15. Id. at 1576-77. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that postsubmission substitution is constitutional as long as the "essential feature" of ajury
trial is preserved and the defendant suffers "no prejudice as a result." Id. at 1576
(citing Hillard, 701 F.2d at 1056-57).
16. Id. at 1574.
17. Id. at 1577. The court concluded that the judge's instructions to "take
whatever time is necessary" to the reconstituted jury was the functional equivalent
of instructing the jury to begin deliberations anew. Id. For a further discussion of
the Third Circuit's analysis of post-submission substitution in Claudio, see infra
notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
18. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1577.
19. For a discussion of the development of the American jury system, see infra
notes 25-55 and accompanying text.
20. For an analysis of Rules 23(b) and 24(c), see infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text.
21. For a review of circuit court decisions on post-submission substitution, see
infra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
22. For a review of the Third Circuit's approach toward post-submission substitution, see infra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
23. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's ruling in Claudio, see infra notes 14888 and accompanying text.
24. For a guide to interpreting the Third Circuit's ruling on post-submission
substitution and the impact on defendants, see infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
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THE JURY SYSTEM

The English colonists who emigrated to America brought with them
the common law right to ajury trial in criminal justice cases. 25 Thus, traditionally the right to a jury trial has been one of the most important
rights for any criminal defendant. 26 Further, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a trial by an impartial jury. 27 The founders of this nation believed
25. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968) (tracing history of jury
trial). The colonists' passion towards the use of the jury trial can be traced to their
deep resentment towards royal interference with the jury trial. Id.
The importance of the jury trial can be traced back to the 18th century, when
Blackstone wrote:
Our law has therefore wisely placed this strong and two-fold barrier, of a
presentment and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and
perogative of the crown. It was necessary, for preserving the admirable
balance of our constitution, to vest the executive power of the laws in the
prince: and yet this power might be dangerous and destructive to that
very constitution, if exerted without check or control, byjustices of oyer
and terminer occasionally named by the crown; who might then, as in
France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch, or exile any man that was obnoxious to the government, by an instant declaration that such is their will
and pleasure. But the founders of the English law have, with excellent
forecast, contrive that . . . the truth of every accusation, whether pre-

ferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and
neighbors, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion.
Id (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349,
349-50 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1899)).
For a historical perspective ofjuries in America, see McDermott, supranote 1,
at 849-53.
26. Thompson v. State of Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898) (noting colonists
believed that right to trial by their peers was their birthright and inheritance from
England). On October 14, 1774 at the First Continental Congress, the colonists
objected to trials before judges paid by the Crown and trials held in England for
crimes allegedly committed on colonial soil. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152 (citing
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 270, 288 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959)). The Congress
declared: "'That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by
their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law."' Id. (quoting
SOURCE OF OUR LIBERTIES 288 (R. Perry ed., 1959)). The Constitution answered
the colonists concerns by mandating jury trials. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 3 ("The
trial of all Crimes ... shall be by Jury."). Next, the Sixth Amendment provided
that an individual shall enjoy a trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
Finally, the importance of the jury trial was applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157-88 ("[I]n the American States...
a general grant ofjury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential for
preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for
all defendants."). The Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
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28
that the jury trial was an essential ingredient for a thriving democracy.
Therefore, this right is guaranteed in Article III, section 2, clause 3 of the
United States Constitution: "The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
29
Impeachment, shall be by Jury."

Many commentators believe the use of a twelve member jury is supe30
rior to a system relying only on professional judges to render verdicts.
Many supporters of the jury system praise the current system's ability to
carve out a representative cross-section of society that can apply its overall
common sense judgement to the particular facts at hand. 3 ' Some critics
argue, however, that the jury system is plagued with problems because the
best qualified individuals usually are exempted, while uneducated, less32
qualified individuals are chosen instead.

crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
28. See 3 LESTER B. ORFIELD, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 23:2, at 4-5 (1966) (viewing jury trial as "traditionally... one of the
most important rights of the criminal defendant"); see also Philip H. Corboy, The
Right to Trial by Jury, 4 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 65, 68 (1980) (discussing founders
praise of jury system). The importance of the jury trial in our legal system is
demonstrated by the Constitution's original guarantee to a trial by jury and by the
fact that every state which has entered the union has protected the jury trial in one
form or another. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 153-54.
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
30. See Corboy, supra, note 27, at 68-69 (criticizing commentators who believe
professional judges possess superior fact-finding abilities over jury of peers); see also
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 (commenting that jury provides protection against corrupt
prosecutor or biasedjudge); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (opining that jury system was "clearly intended to protect the accused from oppression
by the Government"); SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BYJURY 164 (1956) (recognizing
that one of tyrant's main objectives would be to eliminate trial by jury); McDermott, supra note 1, at 850 (discussing how commentators label jury process as "remarkable political institution"). One commentator notes that the jury system is
"an exciting experiment in human affairs." Id. at 850 n.27 (citing HARRY KALVERN,
JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 1 (1966)).
31. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 (commenting that framers felt "[i]f the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but
perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it"); see also
McDermott, supra note 1, at 851, n.32 (citing REID HASTIE ET. AL., INSIDE THEJURY 5

(1983) (opining "[bly bringing together representative cross-sections of the community and their aggregate common sense judgment, the process promotes accurate and reliable findings of fact")).
32. See Duncan,391 U.S. at 157 (commenting "at the heart of the dispute have
been express or implicit assertions that juries are incapable of adequately understanding evidence or determining issues of fact, and that they are unpredictable,

quixotic, and little better than a roll of dice").
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Nevertheless, juries historically have been a mechanism designed to
prevent oppression by the government.33 In Duncan v. Louisiana,34 the
Supreme Court commented that "providing an accused with the right to
be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge."3 5 This thought reflects the views of the framers of the
Constitution that a professional judge does not possess superior factfinding abilities over a jury of our peers to guard against violations of our
constitutional rights. 3 6 Therefore, the Duncan Court decided that the best

way to protect against governmental infringement of a defendant's rights
is through a jury composed of a representative cross-section of the
37
community.
The right to a twelve-member jury developed through the Magna
Carta and English common law before being brought to the United
States.3 8 Therefore, the Supreme Court originally held that a jury must
33. For a discussion of the development of the jury as a way to combat against
government oppression, see supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.

34. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
35. Id. at 156. In Duncan, the defendant was convicted of simple battery
under Louisiana law. Id. at 146. Simple battery was considered a misdemeanor,
punishable by a maximum of two years in prison and a fine of $300. Id. The trial
court denied the defendant's request for ajury trial because the Louisiana Constitution only granted a jury trial in cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed. Id. The defendant was sentenced only to
serve 60 days in jail in a parish prison and pay a $150 fine. Id. The defendant
sought review from the Supreme Court, alleging his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to a jury trial were violated by the trial court's ruling. Id. at 146-47.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court's denial of a jury trial violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantee to ajury trial. Id. at 149-50. The Court
concluded "[ilt is sufficient for our purposes to hold that a crime punishable by
two years in prison is, based on past and contemporary standards in this country, a
serious crime and not a petty offense. Consequently, appellant was entitled to a
jury trial and it was error to deny it." Id. at 161-62.
36. Id. at 156. The Court opined "the jury trial provisions in the Federal and
State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official
power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group ofjudges." Id.
37. Id. The Duncan Court explained that the:
Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or

innocence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right ofjury trial
in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement
qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States.

Id.
38. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898). The Court opined:
"Those who emigrated to this country from England brought with them [the right
to a jury of twelve members] 'as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that
admirable common law which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every
side against the approaches of arbitrary power."' Id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1779). But see Felix
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contain twelve members to be constitutional.3 9 The Court continued to
40
mandate the need for a twelve-member jury in federal criminal cases.
Then, in the seminal case Williams v. F/orida,4 1 the Supreme Court held
that although the federal Constitution does not preserve the common law
right to ajury of twelve persons, it does preserve the "essential feature" of
the jury's deliberative process at common law. 42 The Court described the
"essential feature" of the jury's deliberative process as "the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a
group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence." 43 The Court concluded that the precise number twelve was simply
Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty FederalOffenses and the ConstitutionalGuaranty of Trial byJury, 39 HARV. L. Rnv. 917, 922 n.14 (1926) (disagreeing with Thomp-

son Court's reliance on Magna Carta as historians have discovered number 12 was
historical accident).
39. Thompson, 170 U.S. at 349-50. In Thompson, the defendant was convicted
by a jury of only eight members in a Utah court. Id. at 344. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of the defendant because Utah's constitutional provision
allowing for a jury of eight members was an ex post facto law as applied to the
defendant. Id. at 355. The Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to ajury trial required 12jurors to deliberate. Id. The Court reasoned that at
common law ajury of "twelve persons, neither more nor less" was required. Id. at
349. The Court stated that the words 'jury" and "trial by jury" in the Constitution
encompassed the common law requirement of twelvejurors. Id. at 350. The Court
further reasoned that if ajury is reduced from 12jurors to eight, there is no way to
prevent the eventual erosion of the jury system altogether. Id. at 353.
40. See Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 10 (1961) (holding that "under
our system, a man is entitled to the findings of 12 jurors on evidence fairly and
properly presented to them").
41. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
42. Id. at 100 (proclaiming jury number should be large enough to promote
deliberation free from outside intimidation and provide for cross-section of community); see Grunat, supra note 1, at 865-66 ("The Court found that one essential
feature is the 'commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,' free from outside
influences.").
The Williams Court found, after carefully tracing the history of 12 jurors
throughout common law, that the precise number 12 was simply a "historical accident." Williams, 399 U.S. at 102. The Court relied on Justice Harlan's dissent in
Duncan v. Louisiana. Id. (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 182 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
In Duncan,Justice Harlan opined: "I should think it equally obvious that the rule,
imposed long ago in federal courts, that jury' means 'jury of exactly twelve,' is not
fundamental to anything: there is no significance except to mystics in the number
12." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 182 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In Williams, the defendant claimed that the Florida court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to ajury trial by refusing to grant his pretrial motion to impanel
a 12-memberjury. Williams, 399 U.S. at 79-80. The Florida court had impanelled a
six-member jury pursuant to state law, which provided that a six-member jury was
appropriate in all but capital cases. Id. at 80.
43. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. The Court commented that neither the performance of this "essential feature," nor the reliability of the jury as a fact-finder
were a function of its size. Id. Admittedly, the Court noted that the size of thejury
should "probably be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from
outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a
representative cross-section of the community." Id. The Court, however, espoused
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a historical accident, and ajury's size should be left up to the legislature to
decide. 44 Therefore, ajury composed of less than twelvejurors is constitutional in federal criminal cases even though twelve-member juries are the
national norm. 45
One of the most integral ingredients to a successful deliberation process is an impartial jury. 46 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to
be tried by an impartial jury that is free from outside influences. 47 An
integral aspect of preserving an impartial jury is protecting the privacy and
secrecy of jury deliberations. 48 Many commentators and courts believe
that an individual juror's prejudices are conquered by the "free and uncoerced" participation of all the jurors. 49 In order to preserve this free
that ajury comprised of six members would achieve these goals when the requirement of unanimity is retained. Id.
44. Id. at 102-03. The Williams Court opined:
To read the Sixth Amendment as forever codifying a feature so incidental
to the real purpose of the Amendment is to ascribe a blind formalism to
the Framers which would require considerably more evidence than we
have been able to discover in the history and language of the Constitution or in the reasoning of our past decisions.
Id.
The Court made it clear that they did not mean to discourage legislatures
from concluding that there can not be good reasons to prefer a 12-member jury to
a smaller jury. Id. at 103. To guide legislatures, the Court commented that a 12member jury may be more preferable in capital cases in recognition of the value of
a larger juror group as a means of legitimating society's decision to impose the
death penalty. Id. Subsequent to Congress' grant of procedural rule-making authority to the Supreme Court, the Court enacted Rules 23 and 24. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771 (1982) (authorizing Supreme Court rule-making authority); see also FED. R.
CRiM. P. 23(b) (providing for I1-member jury verdicts).
45. SeeFED. R. Ceum. P. 23(b) (recommendingjuries of 12). Rule 23(b) states:
"Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in
writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number less
than twelve .... Id.
46. See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978) (opining that even silent alternate's presence during deliberations would violate privacy
and secrecy of jury); United States v. Leser, 358 F.2d 313, 318 (9th Cir. 1966)
(discussing possibility of impinging upon secrecy and privacy of jury by allowing
post-submission substitution); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d
868, 872 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding that "the presence of the alternate in the jury
room violated the cardinal principle that the deliberations of the jury shall remain
private and secret in every case"); see also Grunat, supra note 1, at 866 (recognizing
need to protect privacy and secrecy of jury deliberations); McDermott, supra note
1, at 851-52 (same).
47. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
48. See Grunat, supranote 1, at 866 (emphasizing need to protect privacy and
secrecy of jury).
49. See McDermott, supra note 1, at 852 (presenting views of social scientists).
Courts and social scientists agree that the free and uncoerced participation of all
jurors overcomes each individual's biases and allows a more accurate and objective
determination of fact. Id. at 852 n.41 (citing REID HASTIE ET. AL., INSIDE THEJURY 5
(1983)). The intentional secrecy surrounding jury deliberations encourages the
sharing of information. Id. at 852 n.42 (citing CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES & PROBLEMS 12 (1988));
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exchange of ideas and mutual trust between jurors, the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence purposely preserved the secrecy of the delibera50
tion process.
One obstacle to free and uncoerced deliberations is the composition
of the actual jury; some social scientists have found that a jury's
demographics may affect the deliberation process.5 1 Courts have commented on how the substitution of alternate jurors after the original jury
52
has begun deliberations can adversely impact the deliberation process.
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recognized that
when an alternate joins a jury after deliberations begin, the original jury
usually has a coercive influence on the alternate; thus, the original jury
may force the alternate to prematurely agree with its decision. 53 Research
also illustrates that a new group member will usually find it difficult to
change the opinions of an established group and may even favor the incorrect perceptions of the group. 54 These studies and opinions have lead to
see also United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982) (preserving
impartiality ofjury through private deliberations free from external influences).
50. See FED. R EVID. 606(b) (preserving sanctity of deliberations). Rule
606(b) reads as follows:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
Id.
51. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 5, 121 (1983) (discussing effects of
factors such as age, sex and socio-economics on deliberation process). The way a
juror interacts and deliberates with the other jurors may be governed by their social characteristics and thus impacts the dynamics of the jury. Id.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (commenting that "[t] he inherent coercive effect upon an alternate juror who joins a
jury that has, as in this case, already agreed that the accused is guilty is substantial"); United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 469-70 (10th Cir. 1972) (discussing
application of prejudice test if alternate retires with jury).
53. See Orfield, TrialJurors, supra note 4, at 50. The drafters of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure were worried that if post-submission substitutions were al-

lowed, "the members of the regular jury might bring such influence on a dissenter
as to disable him and then require an alternate." Id. For example, "the alternate
may have been exposed to improper influences before he takes part as he does not
previously sit in the jury room." Id.
54. Grunat, supra note 1, at 878-79 nn.124-25. One study concentrated on
what happens when a child with leadership qualities and a strong personality associates with an established group of children with their own traditions and rules. Id.
at 878 n.124 (citing Merei, Group Leadership and Institutionalization,2 HUM. REL. 23

(1949)). The study revealed that the new child's personality was engulfed into the
established group, and the child's original ideas were never accepted by the group.
Id. Similarly, this study has been applied to jurors, revealing that newcomers usu-

ally cannot change the ideas of the established group ofjurors and soon succumb
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an increased debate among courts over whether post-submission substitution of alternate jurors endangers the impartiality of the jury.55
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RULES

24(c)
A.

AND 23(B)

The OriginalRules

Rules 24(c) and 23(b) were adopted to preserve the impartiality of
the jury when juror substitution became necessary. 56 Under Rule 23(b), if
ajuror became incapacitated or disqualified during deliberations, the case
would most likely end in mistrial. 5 7 This resulted in a substantial expenditure of prosecution, defense and court resources. 58 Rule 24(c) allows an
to their beliefs. Id. (citingJ.

FREEDMAN ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 157-58 (1970);
Note, CriminalProcedure-JuryTrial-Rule 24(c) of the FederalRules of Criminal Procedure Requires Discharge of AlternateJurorWhen Jury Acts As Separate Entity, 19 WAYNE L.

REv. 1605, 1614 n.57 (1973)). Further, studies show that a new group member

may internalize the incorrect perceptions of an established group rather than stick
to his or her correct perceptions. Id. at 878 n.125. One study placed individuals
into groups of eight male college students. Id. (citing Solomon E. Asch, Effects of
Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgements, 2 READINGS IN SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2 (1952)). The group was then asked a series of questions and seven out
of the eight students would answer the questions incorrectly. Id. On most occasions, the subject would conform to the group's answer and adopt an answer contrary to the objective facts. Id. Similarly, commentators have applied this study to
jury deliberations, finding that an alternate juror could be pressured into adopting
the opinions of the original jurors. Id. (citing HARRY KALVERN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 462-63 (1966)).
55. For a review of cases discussing the constitutionality of post-submission
substitution, see infra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
56. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 298301 (1983) (discussing amendment to Rule 23(b) as solution to post-submission
juror substitution after deliberations begin). The original Rule 23(b) read:
Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of
any number less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be returned by a jury
of less than 12 should the court find it necessary to excuse one or more
jurors for any cause after trial commences.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
57. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 298; see also
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c), 23(b); United States v. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d 418, 419
(5th Cir. 1992) (upholding replacement of juror after deliberations because of
hearing disability); Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding
dismissal of two jurors during deliberations because one became ill with flu and

other had been intoxicated); United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir.
1975) (excusing juror during deliberations because of death of friend was reversible error); Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313, 314-17 (9th Cir. 1966) (allowing
replacement of juror because juror scheduled important medical procedure and

defendant stipulated to replacement).
58. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 298. For a
discussion concerning the probability of a mistrial if a juror was removed after

deliberation began, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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59
alternate juror to replace one of the original jurors prior to deliberation.
Also under the original Rule 23(b), if a juror became incapacitated after
deliberations, then the jury could proceed with less than twelve members
60
where the defense and prosecution consented and the judge approved.
The original rules gave the defendant a tactical advantage because he
or she would never consent to a jury of less than twelve members when
some advantage could be gained by a mistrial. 6 1 In response to this problem, courts created their own post-submission substitution procedures in
62
direct contravention to Rule 24(c).
The Supreme Court never directly addressed the constitutionality of
the post-submission substitution of alternates for regular jurors. 63 Nevertheless, in 1942, the Supreme Court did question the constitutionality of
such a procedure when it was proposed by the Federal Rules Committee as
an amendment to Rule 24(c). 64 In fact, when the Supreme Court expressed their doubts as to the desirability and constitutionality of the proposal to permit the post-submission substitution of an alternate juror
65
during deliberations, the Federal Rules Committee abandoned the idea.

B.

The Amended Rules After 1983

In an attempt to alleviate the dilemma caused by the post-submission
discharge of jurors, the Federal Rules Committee presented the Supreme
59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c). For a review of the applicable text of Rule 24(c),
see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
60. FED. R. CRIM P. 23(b); see Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 91 F.R.D. 289, 337-38 (1981) (discussing
problems associated with original enactment of Rule 23(b)). The Committee favored amending Rule 23(b). Id. The Committee found this to be a better approach, rather than amending Rule 24(c) to allow for substitution of incapacitated
or disqualified jurors with alternate jurors after deliberations began. Id.
61. FED. R. CrIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 299. Without the defendant's consent, Rule 24(b) mandated that a mistrial be declared. Id.
at 298.
62. For a review of courts that improvised their own post-submission procedures, see supra notes 8-10 and infra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
63. Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1575 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1329 (1996). The Third Circuit opined "[t]he Supreme Court has not specifically
ruled on the constitutionality of substituting an alternate juror after jury deliberations have begun." Id. The closest the Supreme Court has come to ruling on this
issue was in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
303 (1996). In Olano, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the alternate's presence in the jury deliberation room because the
alternate was told not to participate. Id. at 739-41.
64. Orfield, TrialJurors, supra note 4, at 44-54. When the Committee submitted one of its drafts providing for post-submission substitution to the Supreme
Court, the Court questioned the constitutionality of such a procedure. Id. at 46.
The Court asked "(h] as the committee satisfied itself that it is desirable or constitutional that an alternate juror may be substituted after the jury has retired and
begun its deliberation?" Id.
65. Id. at 47.
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Court with two solutions.6 6 The first proposal was to amend Rule 23(b) to
permit an eleven-juror verdict at the discretion of the trial judge, even if
the defense counsel objected. 6 7 The second proposal was to amend Rule
24 to permit the substitution of an alternate juror during deliberations, as
68
long as the judge instructs the jury to begin deliberations again.
The Advisory Committee adopted the discretionary eleven-member
deliberation process. 69 The Committee believed that the Rule 24 propo66. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, advisory committee's note, 91 F.R-D. 289, 337-45 (1981).
67. Id. at 337-38. The proposal read "[e]ven absent [stipulation by parties
agreeing to 11-member jury], if the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for
just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the
court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors." Id. This proposal would remove the defendant's tactical advantage because a judge would no
longer need the defendant's consent to proceed with less than 12 jurors. Id. at
339.
68. Id. at 341-45. The Committee proposed to amend Rule 24 by adding
24(d). Id. at 342-43. Proposed Rule 24(d) stated:
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors
who become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their
duties. After the jury has retired to consider its verdict, a juror may be
replaced only by an alternate juror retained as provided in subdivision
(c) of this rule, in which case the court shall instruct the entire jury to
commence their deliberations anew.
Id.
Also, the Committee proposed to amend Rule 24(c) by adding the language:
"Alternate jurors shall not be present at the deliberations of the jury, but such
number as the court shall, in its discretion, decide to be necessary shall be retained
and not discharged while the jury is deliberating." Id. at 342. Further, the proposal would have removed 24(c)'s language stating "[a]n alternate juror who does
not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its
verdict." Id.
69. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 97 F.R.D.
245, 297-98 (1983) (amending Rule 23(b)). The 1983 amendment to 23(b) added
one provision to the end of the original rule: "Even absent [defense and prosecution] stipulation, if the court finds it necessary to excuse ajuror for just cause after
the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid
verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors." Id.
The Advisory Committee believed proceeding with 11 jurors was "constitutionally permissible." Id. at 298 (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)). The
Committee opined that to proceed with 11 jurors was much less objectionable than
declaring a mistrial and expending substantial funds on a retrial. Id. at 299. When
discussing the impact of the original 23(b)'s defendant's consent requirement, the
Committee commented "[flor a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the
impact such a retrial would have upon that court's ability to comply with speedy
trial limits in other cases, such a result is most undesirable." Id. at 299-300.
In the introductory note to the proposed amendments to Rules 23 and 24, the
Committee commented that "[a]t present, a majority of the Advisory Committee
favors the Rule 23 approach. However, the Committee is interested in maximum
input from the bench and bar on this problem, and to that end is circulating both
the Rule 23 and Rule 24 alternatives for comment." Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, advisory committee's
note, 91 F.R.D. at 337. The Supreme Court adopted the Rule 23 proposal, showing its approval for an 11-member jury and its indirect condemnation of the post-
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sal to allow for post-submission substitution would endanger the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury because of the
inability to nullify the influences of the earlier deliberations of the regular
jurors, possible invasions of jury privacy and coercive effects on the alternate juror.70 Moreover, the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice also rejected the post-submission substitution procedure and found it
undesirable to allow ajuror to join the group without the benefit of earlier
71
group discussions.
C. Effects on the Defendant's SubstantialRights as the Standardfor Reversal
Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are meant to simplify criminal procedures and ensure fairness in the administration ofjustice, 72 many federal courts have departed from the procedures set forth by
submission substitution proposal under the Rule 24 proposal. Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 245 (1983).
70. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 91 F.R.D. at 301. The Committee opined:
The central difficulty with substitution ... is that there does not appear to

be any way to nullify the impact of what has occurred without the participation of the newjuror. Even were it required that the jury "review" with
the new juror their prior deliberations or that the jury upon substitution
start deliberations anew, it still seems likely that the continuing jurors
would be influenced by the earlier deliberations and that the new juror
would be somewhat intimidated by the others by virtue of being a newcomer to the deliberations. As for the possibility of sending in the alternates at the very beginning with instructions to listen but not to
participate until substituted, this scheme is likewise attended by practical
difficulties and offends "the cardinal principle that the deliberations of
the jury shall remain private and secret in every case."
Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir.
1964)).
71. See 3 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-2.7, commentary at 15-74
(1980) (criticizing post-submission substitution). The commentary stated "it is not
desirable to allow ajuror who is unfamiliar with the prior deliberations to suddenly
join the group and participate in the voting without the benefit of earlier group
discussions." Id.
Most commentators agreed with the Committee's rejection of post-submission
substitution for the same reasons. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES

§ 388, at 384-93 (2d ed. 1996) (criticizing post-submission

substitution). Wright concluded that:
To permit substitution[s] of an alternate after deliberations have begun
would require either that the alternate participate though he has missed
part of the jury discussion, or that he sit in with the jury in every case on
the chance he might be needed. Either course is subject to practical difficulty and to strong constitutional objection.
Id. at 393; see a/soJAMES MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE para. 24.05 (2d
ed. 1996) ("The inherent coercive effect upon an alternate who joins a jury leaning heavily toward a guilt verdict may result in the alternate reaching a premature
guilty verdict.").
72. See FED R. CIuM P. 2 ("[The rules] shall be construed to secure simplicity
in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.").
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the Supreme Court and Congress by allowing post-submission substitution. 73 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide two rules that
set forth the standard of review for departures from the rules.74 Rule
52(a) explains that any deviations that do not affect the substantial rights
75
of the defendant are harmless errors and are not subject to reversal.
Rule 57 further allows district courts to regulate their practice in any way
not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 76 Therefore, when evaluating a court's procedural deviations from Rule 24(c) in
allowing for post-submission substitution in direct violation of Rule 24(c),
a reversal is not proper unless the deviation affects the defendant's substantial rights. 77 Thus, the question courts have faced is whether substitution of a regular juror with an alternate juror after deliberations begin
78
endangers the substantial rights of a defendant.
73. For a discussion of courts that improvise their own post-submission procedures in violation of Rule 24(c), see supra notes 8-10 and infra notes 79-121 and
accompanying text.
74. See FED. R. CiwM. P. 52(a) (discussing harmless errors); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57
(providing procedure for adoption of local rules). For a discussion of Rules 52(a)
and 57, see infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
75. FED. R. CRIM P. 52(a). Rule 52(a) states: "Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Id.
76. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a). Rule 57(a) provides, in pertinent part: "Each district court acting by a majority of its district judges may, after giving appropriate
public notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing
its practice... consistent with... Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28
U.S.C. § 2072 ....
Id.
77. See FED. R. CriM. P. 52(a) advisory committee's notes, 97 F.R.D. 245
(1983) (noting that current rule is based upon 28 U.S.C. former § 391 and 18
U.S.C. former § 556 that judgment should stand unless it affects substantial rights
or is prejudicial to defendant); see also Claudio v. Synder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1575-77 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding post-submission substitution procedure is harmless error). For
a discussion of cases when defendants challenge post-submission procedures
under Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, see infra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
78. See Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1575 (discussing rights involved in post-submission
substitution cases including defendant's right to trial by jury under Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments).
The plain language of Rule 24(c) allows for the substitution of a regular juror
when he or she is incapacitated or disqualified prior to the start of deliberations.
FED. R. CiuM. P. 24(c). For a discussion of Rule 24(c) and its adoption, see supra
notes 5-8, 63-71 and accompanying text.
Courts are in agreement that substitution prior to deliberation is constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Floyd, 496 F.2d 982, 990 (2d Cir.) (replacingjuror
due to prejudice); United States v. Domenech, 476 F.2d 1229, 1232 (2d Cir. 1973)
(removing juror because tardy); United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333, 334-35
(3d Cir. 1972) (replacing juror for being asleep 50% of time); United States v.
Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 712 (7th Cir. 1966) (replacing juror because his mother went
through surgery and was not expected to live); United States v. Houlihan, 332 F.2d
8, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1964) (excusing juror because she was nurse and her patient
suffered heart attack); United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30, 43 (3d Cir. 1964)

(removing juror because placed on jury erroneously after responding to another
juror's name); United States v. Zambito, 315 F.2d 266, 269 (4th Cir. 1963) (replacing juror because he had not truthfully responded during voir dire as to whether
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POsT-SUBMISSION SUBSTITUTION IN FEDERAL COURTS

Eight United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have addressed whether
post-submission juror substitution is constitutional. 79 There is a growing
trend among some of the circuits to sidestep Rule 24(c)'s mandatory pro80
hibition against post-submission substitution.
A.

The LiberalApproach: ProceduralPrecautionsto EliminatePrejudice

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a liberal approach to post-submission juror
substitutions through reasoning that substitutions do not endanger a defendant's right to a fair trial and an impartial jury if procedural precautions are taken.8 1 These circuits believe that procedures, such as
obtaining the defendant's consent and properly instructing the jury, elimi82
nate any prejudice to the defendant.
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that post-submission substitution procedures violate Rule 24(c), but do not constitute reversible
errors unless the violation is prejudicial to the defendant.8 3 The Seventh
federal gambling stamp was issued to him or his family); Banks v. United States,
204 F.2d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 1953) (replacingjuror because during voir dire examination he had misstated extent of his own tax problems), vacated, 348 U.S. 905
(1955); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (replacingjuror
because she misrepresented herself during voir dire by answering questions dishonestly concerning her opposition to the death penalty).
79. For a discussion reviewing the post-submission juror substitution procedures in these circuits, see infra notes 82-123 and accompanying text.
80. For a discussion of the trend among the circuits to improvise their own
post-submission procedures in violation of Rule 24(c), see supra notes 14-16 and
infra notes 89-134 and accompanying text.
81. For a discussion regarding the liberal approach taken by the Seventh,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits see infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of improvised post-submission substitution procedures in
the liberal circuits, see infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 589 (allowing post-submission substitution); Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 125-26 (7th Cir. 1981)
(allowing alternate juror to witness deliberations); Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d
175, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1980) (allowing post-submission substitution).
In Johnson v.Duckworth, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's right to
a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is not violated by allowing an alternate juror to be present during deliberations. Duckworth, 650 F.2d
at 125-26. In Duckworth, the trial judge instructed an "alternate juror to attend, but
not participate in the jury's deliberations." Id. at 123. The district court advised
the alternate:
Alternate juror, Harold Lett, you will retire with the jury. But unless, and
until, we excuse ajuror and you are directed to actively serve, you are not
to vote or participate in the deliberations. You should, however, listen, so
that should you be called upon to serve, you will have the benefit of the
preceding discussions.
Id. at 123 n.1.
The Duckworth court commented that alternate jurors are indistinguishable
from regular jurors because they not only participate in the same strict selection
process, but also witness the same events as the original jurors. Id. at 125. When
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Circuit, however, has stated that the language behind Rule 24(c) forbids
post-submission substitutions.8 4 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit in
l 85
United States v. Josefik
held that the substitution of an alternate juror was
not a reversible error because procedural precautions eliminated any prejudice to the defendants, and the defendants consented to the court recalling the alternate.86 Recently, however, the Seventh Circuit in United States
v. Ottersburg87 held that allowing two alternate jurors to deliberate with the
original twelve jurors and sign a verdict form was highly prejudicial to the
defendants and thus, required reversal. 88
an alternate accompanies the original jurors into deliberations, he or she has no
more or less knowledge about the case than the others and is no more biased than
any of the other jurors. Id. The court recognized the necessity for privacy and
secrecy in jury deliberations, but stated, "[w]e do not agree that alternate jurors
pose the inherent risk of influencing the jury's judgement, or inhibiting its debate,
that is posed by the presence of other strangers." Id. at 126.
Furthermore, in Henderson v. Lane, the Seventh Circuit ruled that "the essential feature of the jury" was preserved when the defendant's attorney examined the
alternate juror and decided he was able to deliberate fairly with the others. Henerson, 613 F.2d at 179. In Henderson, the trial court discharged the two alternates
when the regular jurors retired to deliberate. Id. at 176. Subsequently, one of the
regularjurors suffered a heart attack after two and one-half hours of deliberations.
Id. The trial court recalled the two alternates and the judge questioned them on
their activities since discharge. Id. The alternates promised that they had not
made a decision about the defendant's guilt, but one admitted talking to his wife
about the facts of the case. Id. Defense counsel refused to stipulate to an 11member jury. Id. As a result, counsel implicitly agreed to allow an alternate to
replace the ill juror. Id. Within five hours, the reconstituted jury found the defendant guilty of murder. Id. at 177.
The Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's right to a jury trial was not
undermined by the substitution procedure. Id. at 179. The court held that the
"essential feature of the jury" was preserved because the alternate was subject to
the same selection procedures as the other jurors. Id. at 178. Moreover, the defense attorney was present during the reinstatement proceedings and was permitted to examine the alternate juror. Id. Finally, the alternate juror assured the
court that he had not formed any opinions on the defendant's guilt or innocence.
Id. at 179. Thus, the substitution was appropriate. Id.
84. Josefik, 753 F.2d at 587. The Seventh Circuit opined that: "There is no
provision for recalling an alternate after he is discharged and we think policy as
well as statutory language . . . forbid[s] the practice." Id.
85. 753 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1985).
86. Id. at 587-88. During the trial, the remaining alternate juror was excused
when the regular jurors began deliberations. Id. at 587. After nine minutes of
deliberations, one of the regular jurors informed the judge that she should be
excused because she had trouble hearing during the trial. Id. The judge immediately called the alternate and informed her not to discuss the case with anyone. Id.
After questioning the alternate, the parties agreed to the substitution of her for the
regularjuror. Id. In affirming this decision of the lower court, the Seventh Circuit
held that the defendant was not prejudiced by this substitution because the reconstituted jury was instructed to begin deliberations anew, the parties' counsels consented to the substitution after questioning the alternate, and the alternate only
missed nine minutes of deliberations. Id. at 587-88.
87. 76 F.3d 137 (7th Cir.), decision clarified on denial of reh'g by 81 F.3d 657 (7th
Cir. 1996).
88. Id. at 140.
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Similarly the Ninth Circuit has concluded that post-submission substitutions are permissible under Rule 24(c) if the defendant suffers no prejudice and he or she knowingly and intelligently consents to the
substitution.8 9 The Ninth Circuit has held that without the knowing and
intelligent consent of the defendant, post-submission substitution was a
reversible error because the new juror was placed into a coercive atmosphere where the jury had already reached a verdict. 90 Nevertheless, the
89. See, e.g., Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1966) (allowing
post-submission substitution when defendant consents). In Leser, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a post-submission substitution by the trial court because the defense
counsel stipulated to the substitution in the presence of the defendants. Id.
Before deliberations began, one of the jurors informed the court that he had
scheduled a medical procedure during deliberations, and both parties so stipulated to allowing the substitution of the juror after the beginning of deliberations
if necessary. Id. at 314-16. The day before the case was submitted to the jury for
consideration, the court informed the attorneys that one of jurors had to go into
the hospital for a serious operation. Id. at 314. The juror told the court that he
would postpone the operation if the case would go to the jury the next day. Id.
The court suggested to the attorneys that they stipulate to allowing a post-submission substitution of an alternate juror for the ill juror. Id. at 315. The defense
counsel agreed to retaining the alternates in case any juror became ill and could
not participate in deliberations. Id. After the jury could not come to a conclusion,
on the following day, the judge excused the ill juror and substituted the alternate
in his place. Id. at 316.
The Ninth Circuit found that no prejudice occurred from this substitution
because the defendant and its counsel knowingly consented earlier in the trial. Id.
at 317. The Leser court pointed out that the defense had every opportunity to

refuse to the stipulation. Id. Because the defendant did not express any dissent
when his counsel stipulated to the post-submission substitution, the defendant
knowingly waived his rights. Id.
90. United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975). In Lamb, the
Ninth Circuit limited the holding in Leser to cases when both sides agree to the
substitution. Id. at 1157. During the trial, after the district judge instructed the
jury, the judge told the alternate to go home, but be ready to return if necessary.
Id. at 1154-55. After lunch recess, the judge received a note from one of the regular jurors that read: "Your Honor, due to the sudden accidental death of one of my

close co-workers during the course of this trial, I feel emotionally unable to come
to a decision." Id. at 1155. The trial judge then called the alternate and asked her
to return to court. Id. Subsequently, the jury informed the judge that it had
reached a verdict. Id. Thereafter, the judge called the alternate and told her not
to return. Id. After questioning the depressed juror, the judge excused the juror
and asked the defense counsel to agree to substituting an alternate. Id. The de-

fense counsel objected, but the judge called back the alternate and had her join
the jury. Id. The judge ordered the jury "to begin at the beginning, and begin all
you deliberation just as if the case had been submitted to you this instant." Id.

Despite the district court judge's instructions to the reconstituted jury to begin
deliberations anew, the jury rendered a guilty verdict in 29 minutes, despite taking
four hours before the substitution. Id.
The Ninth Circuit refused to extend the Leser stipulation to cases where the

defense counsel implied consent by not objecting to the judge's instructions to an
alternate to remain ready. Id. at 1157. In fact, the defense attorney objected to the
substitution of the alternate juror. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded:

That impermissible coercion upon the alternate juror in this case was
manifestly inherent, and that there was not the conscientious, careful reconsideration by the twelve of the newly constituted jury would seem ap-
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Ninth Circuit held that California's procedure for substitution of jurors
after beginning deliberations preserves the "essential feature" of the jury
as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when the defendant consents. 9 1
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit has traditionally taken a liberal stance
towards post-submission substitutions. 92 The Eleventh Circuit has allowed
parent from the fact that, despite the district judge's instruction to the
jury to "begin at the beginning," a jury that had required almost four
hours to reach its initial verdict needed, after being reconstituted, only
twenty-nine minutes to find the appellant guilty a second time.
Id. at 1156.
The Lamb Court further commented that even if there was a clear stipulation
by the defendant agreeing to the substitution, the court would still reverse and
remand this case. Id. at 1157. It determined that the original jury's guilty verdict
and the judge's instructions to the alternate that she was no longer needed compromised the defendant's right to ajury trial. Id. The Lamb court stated that when
the trial judge released the alternate, her duties, including confidentiality, were no
longer applicable. Id. Thus, the trial judge could never know whether the alternate discussed the case with others. Id.
91. Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In Miller, over the
objections of defense counsel, two jurors were dismissed on the fifth day of jury
deliberations and replaced with alternates. Id. One of the regular jurors called in
sick with the flu and counsel agreed that the ill juror should be discharged and
replaced with an alternate. Id. Then one of the bailiffs informed the judge that a
juror had been intoxicated the previous morning. Id. Also, the judge noted for
the record that the juror had been sleeping during the re-reading of the day's
testimony. Id. Thejuror denied that he was intoxicated, but admitted that he did
fall asleep. Id. Two bailiffs and the jury foreman said that they smelled alcohol on
the juror's breath. Id. The judge removed the juror and replaced him with an
alternate. Id. The trial judge then instructed the reconstituted jury to disregard
earlier deliberations and begin deliberations anew. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court's decision to follow California's post-submission
substitution procedure "preserved the 'essential feature' of the jury required by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
The Miller court was analyzing a California state law that permitted substitution of an alternate when a regular juror is discharged for good cause. Id. at 995
n.3. The case came to federal court on a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 991. Therefore, the state law only had to fulfill the necessary constitutional requirements. Id.
at 995. Unlike Rule 24(c), the California Penal Code does not mandate the discharge of alternates at the beginning of deliberations. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1089, 1123 (West 1996)).
92. See, e.g., Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1986). In Peek, the jury
had been deliberating for only two hours when the jury foreman requested that
the court excuse ajuror who appeared mentally unstable. Id. at 1481-82. Thejury
began deliberations at 10:27 p.m. and at midnight the jury was asked if they would
like to retire for the evening. Id. The jury asked to continue for a few more minutes and approximately 30 minutes later, the jury foreman asked to speak with the
judge. Id. at 1482. The foreman informed the judge that one of the jurors was
"extremely nervous and almost at the breaking point." Id. The foreman also told
the trial judge that the distressed juror asked to be excused. Id. Thereafter, both
counsels agreed to stipulate to the juror's replacement with an alternate. Id.
After the foreman informed the trial judge that the ill juror wanted to be
dismissed, the judge told the foreman that he was not going to start excusing people at random. Id. The foreman asked the trial judge if the ill juror could just
leave, rather than come out in front of the judge. Id. The foreman informed the
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post-submission substitutions when the defendant objects to Rule 23(b)'s
eleven-juror verdict and demands that an alternate be impaneled. 93 In
these instances, however, the trial judge must take procedural safeguards
94
to insure that the defendant is not prejudiced by the substitution.
judge that the ill juror did not want to make a great deal about it. Id. Thus, the
trial judge excused the distressed juror without ever interviewing him. Id. The
trial judge never instructed the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew and
sent the alternate into the deliberation room without any further instructions. Id.
Subsequent fact-finding efforts showed that the replaced juror was the lone
holdout for acquittal. Id. The court and the attorneys were unaware that the distressed juror was the lone holdout as to guilt. Id. Later, at the state habeas court
proceeding, the distressed juror explained:
Well, I got sick-I got so upset, I couldn't stand it anymore and it looked
like I couldn't make a verdict .... Well, it seemed like that I couldn't
make the decision and Ijust kept getting more and more upset .... And
Ijust got so upset, I-it seemed like-I had to disqualify myself... I got
so physically-well, mental upset that I knew I couldn't make a decision.
Id. at 1483 (citations omitted in original).
Almost immediately after the reconstituted jury returned to deliberations it
rendered a guilty verdict that would send the defendant to his death. Id. at 1482.
The trial transcript showed that only three minutes passed before the reconstituted jury entered a guilty verdict. Id. at 1482 n.2. The testimony of the trial
judge, attorneys and jury foreperson indicated, however, that it took between 15
and 30 minutes. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's failure to question the
distressed juror and instructions to the reconstituted jury to begin anew did not
amount to any prejudice against the defendant and affirmed the district court's
decision. Id. at 1483-85. The Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant did not
suffer any prejudice from the trial judge's failure to question the distressed juror
before dismissing him. Id. at 1484. In the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, the distressed juror was too ill to debate or vote at the time he was excused. Id. The
court determined that the defendant's argument that an error occurred when the
judge failed to inform the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew was without merit. Id. at 1485. Further, the Peek court explained that the alternate was
present throughout the entire trial, heard the charge to the original jury and reviewed the case with the jury once he joined them. Id. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated because the
alleged prejudice was "speculative at best." Id.
93. United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (lth Cir. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Guevara, held that the defendant waived any challenge to the substitution of an alternate juror after jury deliberations began
because the defendant expressly demanded that the alternate be impaneled rather
than continue with only I Ijurors. Id. In Guevara, the trial judge questioned the
alternate to make sure he had neither been influenced by the media nor had already decided the case. Id. at 447. Defense counsel stipulated to impaneling the
alternate in place of an ill juror. Id. The trial judge instructed the reconstituted
jury to begin deliberations anew. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the procedure was permissible because the defendant knowingly consented to impanelling
the alternate juror. Id. at 448. Furthermore, the Guevara court explained that the
defendant was given an opportunity to proceed with an 1-member jury pursuant
to Rule 23(b), but refused this option. Id. Thus, the defendant waived his rights

to challenge the post-submission substitution procedure. Id.
94. Id. The Guevaracourt stated that "a procedure constitutes reversible error
only if the defendant is prejudiced by the substitution." Id. In Guevara, the judge
asked the alternate juror whether he had discussed with anyone or exposed himself to extrinsic information involving the case. Id. The trial judge also asked the
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Therefore, as long as there is not unfair prejudice, if a defendant knowingly consents to the substitution, the defendant waives any right to appeal
the procedure. 95
B.

The Conservative Approach: Following Rule 23(b)'s Eleven-Juror Verdict

The United States Courts of Appeal for the Second, Third and Fifth
Circuits have adopted a conservative approach to post-submission juror
substitutions finding that post-submission juror substitutions unnecessarily
endanger a defendant's right to an impartial jury because Rule 23(b) provides the perfect solution. 96 The Fifth Circuit prefers Rule 23(b)'s elevenjuror verdict because it eliminates the risk of prejudice to the defendant
from a post-submission substitution. 9 7 In the past, the Fifth Circuit allowed post-submission substitutions if the judge applied procedural safeguards to eliminate any prejudice to the defendant. 98 Then, in United
remaining 11 jurors whether they could begin deliberations anew. Id. Then the
judge confiscated the materials the original 11 jurors used during the first deliberation. Id. All of these safeguards sought to prevent harmful prejudice to the defendant from the inclusion of the new juror.
95. Id. The Eleventh Circuit stated that "[w]here the defendant knowingly
consents to the addition of an alternate juror, as was obviously the case here, he
waives any challenge to that procedure on appeal." Id.
96. For a discussion about the conservative approach taken by these circuits,
see infra 108-111 notes and accompanying text.
97. See United States v. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d at 420 (stating that "[r] ather
than replace a regularjuror with an alternative juror after the jury has begun deliberations, the proper procedure is for the district court to proceed with an elevenperson jury"); United States v. Huntress, 956 F.2d 1309, 1315 (5th Cir. 1992) (discussing that Rule 23(b) removes trial judge's discretion to use post-submission
substitution).
98. See, e.g., Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d at 421 (allowing post-submission substitution under limited circumstances and when defendant suffered no prejudice);
United States v. Helms, 897 F.2d 1293, 1299 (5th Cir. 1990) (allowing post-submission substitution if Phillips procedures followed), overruled by Huntress, 956 F.2d at
1317; United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 996 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing postsubmission substitution if procedural safeguards followed), overruled by Huntress,
956 F.2d at 1317; United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1973) (allowing alternate's presence in jury room); La-Tex v. Freuhauf, 444 F.2d 1366,
1367-68 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); see also United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565, 57374 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (allowing post-submission substitution).
In United States v. Allison, the Fifth Circuit held that a plain error reversal was
not proper when the parties stipulate that an alternate juror be present during
deliberations. Allison, 481 F.2d at 470-72. In Allison, the trial judge instructed an
alternate to observe deliberations in case an ill juror could not continue through
deliberations, but not to participate in any way. Id. at 470. Both counsels stipulated to the alternate's presence. Id. The alternate was instructed not to disturb
the deliberation process nor take part in anyjury votes. Id. After continuing deliberations for another hour and one-half, the regular juror was feeling better, so the
trial judge immediately discharged the alternate. Id.
The Fifth Circuit stated that while Rule 24(c) prohibits the presence of an
alternate in the jury room, a plain error reversal is improper when both parties
stipulate to the alternate's presence and the alternate follows the court's instructions not to participate in the deliberations. Id. at 472. The Allison court re-
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manded the case to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
alternate participated in the jury deliberations in a way that could have possibly
prejudiced the defendant. Id.
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in La-Tex, held that in a civil case, the defendant's
right to a jury trial was not abrogated by allowing an alternate juror to be present
during deliberations because both counsels consented and the judge instructed
the alternate not to speak during the deliberation process. La-Tex, 444 F.2d at
1367-68. At the end of the La-Tex trial, the judge learned that one of the regular
jurors might have to be excused in order to attend a funeral. Id. at 1367. The
court instructed an alternate juror to observe deliberations, but not participate
unless the regular juror was excused. Id. Both counsels agreed to this procedure.
Id. During deliberations, the alternate made at least one remark and conversed
with several regular jurors, including the foreman, saying: "Let's listen to the foreman." Id. The Fifth Circuit found her remarks to be insignificant and not prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial. Id. Moreover, the court noted that defense
counsel agreed to the substitution procedure before the judge admitted the alternate juror. Id.
A district court in the Fifth Circuit has even allowed the substitution of an
alternate juror after the jury began deliberations after a seven-month criminal
trial. Barone, 83 F.R.D. at 573-74. In Barone, the district court judge replaced a
regular juror who became ill with an alternate juror. Id. at 567. The alternate had
been discharged and was home already for six days. Id. During the questioning by
the judge, the alternate responded that she could deliberate impartially and continue to give all parties a fair trial. Id. The remaining 11 jurors were also questioned by the judge and all responded that they could begin deliberations from
the beginning. Id. The judge then instructed the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew. Id. The judge reasoned that the defendant did not suffer prejudice because the alternate was not formally discharged and had no contact with
the original jurors or the outside world. Id. at 572-74. The district judge concluded that because the benefits derived from deviating from Rule 24(c) were
great in this case and the possible prejudice almost nonexistent, it would be foolish
to not depart from the Rule. Id. at 574.
In Phillips, the Fifth Circuit expanded the district courts' powers by permitting
post-submission substitutions in cases of "exceptional circumstances" and where
the defendant does not suffer from prejudice. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 996 (5th Cir.
1981). The Fifth Circuit held that:
[T] he court's decision to substitute the alternate was made in the context
of a most complex and protracted trial, lasting over four months, of multiple defendants on numerous substantive and conspiracy charges ....
Our conclusion that the district court committed no reversible error must
likewise be understood as limited to such an exceptional context.
Id.
At the end of the Phillips trial and despite the defense counsel's objections,
the district court ordered that the alternate juror be sequestered separately from
the original jurors. Id. at 990. After the jury was instructed, the court discussed
with counsel the possible procedural options if one of the jurors became incapacitated or disqualified after jury deliberations began. Id. The defense counsel objected to two possible procedural options. Id. First, they refused to stipulate to a
jury of less than 12 under Rule 23(b). Id. Second, they objected to the impaneling
of one of the alternates if necessary. Id. Nevertheless, the trial judge decided to
separately sequester the last alternate while the other jurors deliberated. Id.
After two days in deliberations, one of the jurors suffered a heart attack. Id.
The court discharged the ill juror and substituted the alternate juror in his place.
Id. The Fifth Circuit determined that Rule 24(c) is not constitutionally mandated,
and a court may deviate procedurally in situations involving exceptional circumstances. Id. at 992, 996. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Government's position
that the language of Rule 24(c) is not constitutionally mandated. Id. at 992. The
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States v. Huntress,99 the Fifth Circuit held that Rule 23(b)'s eleven juror
verdict is mandatory, but failure to follow Rule 23(b) is not always reversible error. 10 0 If a trial judge allows a post-submission substitution, the reviewing court can still resort to an analysis of the judicially crafted
procedural safeguards used by the Fifth Circuit in the past to salvage the
court, using the reasoning of the California Supreme Court, opined that no constitutional objection occurs when there is good cause for the original juror's dismissal and the jury is instructed to begin anew. Id. at 992-93. The Phillips court stated
that the most substantial concern about post-submission substitution is the danger
that the regular jurors may coerce the alternate if they already decided the defendant's guilt. Id. at 995. Nevertheless, the Phillips court believed that this coercive
atmosphere was eliminated by the procedural mechanisms utilized by the trial
judge. Id. at 996. The Phillips court concluded that the defendant was not
prejudiced because "the instructions to the jury to begin anew, the jurors' individual assurances that they could in fact begin anew, and the full participation of the
substituted alternate in the deliberations, which lasted six days, obviated the danger of undue prejudice." Id.
99. 956 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1992).
100. Id. at 1315. In Huntress, the trial judge dismissed the alternate juror once
deliberations began. Id. at 1311. After two days of deliberations, one of the jurors
checked himself into a hospital and threatened to ingest fire ant killer if the hospital did not allow him to stay. Id. The trial judge called the disturbed juror's doctor, and the doctor informed the judge that the juror was distraught and suicidal
and suffered from paranoia stemming from a history of drug abuse. Id. The doctor told the trial judge that the ill juror could not participate in the deliberations.
Id. at 1312. The trial judge followed the doctor's advice and dismissed the juror
without holding an evidentiary hearing to investigate the incident. Id. The defendant refused to stipulate to a Rule 23(b) 11-juror verdict and objected to recalling the alternate. Id. The defendant then asked that the alternate juror be
recalled and questioned to see whether she could be reimpaneled. Id. After concluding the alternate juror could fairly deliberate, the trial judge instructed the
other 11 jurors that they would have to set aside their previous discussions and
begin deliberations anew. Id. All of the jurors were confident that they could
begin deliberations again. Id. Thereafter, the reconstituted jury returned a guilty
verdict after three hours. Id.
The defendant argued that the verdict should have been reversed for two reasons: (1) the judge should have followed Rule 23(b)'s l-juror verdict; and (2) the
alternate's presence was highly prejudicial to his case. Id. at 1314. The Fifth Circuit agreed that the judge should have followed Rule 23(b), but stated that the
defendant waived his right to complain once he agreed to the substitution of the
alternate. Id. The Fifth Circuit opined that Rule 23(b) eliminates the risk of prejudice to the defendant and should be used whenever a juror becomes incapacitated during deliberations, however, failure to use Rule 23(b) is not fatal. Id. at
1317.
The Huntress court opined that district judges should no longer resort to the
judicially crafted post-submission substitutions and procedural safeguards found in
two earlier cases that the court overruled. Id. (citing Helms, 897 F.2d at 1293; Phillips, 664 F.2d at 971). If a post-submission substitution takes place and a reconstituted jury renders a verdict, however, the verdict will not be reversed unless the
substitution was prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at 1316. The Huntress court held
that the substitution did not prejudice the defendant in the lower court. Id. at
1316-17. In fact, the Huntresscourt still compared the procedural safeguards taken
not to prejudice the defendant with the procedures used in Phillips and Helms,
even though both cases were overruled by Huntress.
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verdict. 10 1 The Fifth Circuit, however, clearly stated that "the amendment
to Rule 23(b) removes from districtjudges any choice between proceeding
with 11 jurors and using [improvised post-submission substitution]
10 2
procedures."
In light of the 1983 amendments to Rule 23(b), the Second Circuit
1 03
has doubts whether post-submission substitutions are permissible.
In the past, the Second Circuit approved of post-submission
substitutions in limited circumstances.10 4 In United States v. Strat101. See, e.g., Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d at 420-21 (holding that when juror is re-

moved from deliberations, proper procedure is to proceed under Rule 23(b), but
if post-submission substitution occurs, verdict should stand if defendant suffers no
prejudice); Huntress, 956 F.2d at 1315-17 (same).
At the end of the trial, the district court in United States v. Quiroz-Cortez dismissed the two alternates, but warned them not to discuss the case with anyone
until the jury's verdict was returned. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d at 419-20. The jury
had only deliberated for 45 minutes when the district court learned one of the
regular jurors had a hearing problem that may have caused him to miss some of
the testimony. Id. The parties agreed to dismiss the juror. Id. Defense counsel,
however, refused to stipulate to an 11-member jury and wanted to move for a mistrial. Id.
After the district court denied the request for a mistrial, defense counsel settled for the first alternate. Id. The district court questioned the alternate who
informed the court that she had not discussed the case with anyone. Id. Thereafter, the court ordered the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations from the beginning so that the alternate could witness everything the jurors discussed. Id.
Although the reconstituted jury only deliberated for an hour and a half before
rendering a verdict, the court reasoned that the defendant was not prejudiced
because the judge instructed the jurors to begin deliberations again. Id. at 420-21.
The Quiroz-Cortez court reasoned that if the defendant suffers no prejudice from
the post-submission substitution, the error is harmless and the conviction stands.
Id. at 420. The Quiroz-Cortez court explained that prejudice is evaluated by examining, among other things, the length of the original jury's deliberations compared
to the reconstituted jury's deliberations and the judge's instructions to the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew. Id. In this case, the court held that the
possibility of prejudice here was minimal because the original jury deliberated for
only 45 minutes and the alternate's exposure to outside influences was minimal.
Id. at 420-21.
102. Huntress, 956 F.2d at 1315. The Huntress court also opined:
The virtues of the 11juror verdict allowed by Rule 23(b) are that it eliminates the risk of prejudice that arises whenever an alternate juror is recalled and does not require the agreement of the parties. District judges in
this circuit therefore should no longer resort to the procedures used in
Phillips and Helms.
Id. at 1317.
103. See United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1985) (casting

doubt on whether post-submission substitutions are permissible with Rule 23(b)'s

amendments).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1061 (2d Cir. 1983) (allowing post-submission substitution if defendant not prejudiced); United States v.
Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944, 950-51 (2d Cir. 1968) (allowing retention of alternates after
deliberation if no prejudice to defendant).
The Second Circuit first addressed this issue in 1968. United States v. Hayutin,
398 F.2d at 950-51. In Hayutin, the district court judge did not replace any jurors
after deliberations began, but refused to discharge three alternates at the com-
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ton,1 0 5 however, the Second Circuit affirmed a trial judge's decision to ac-

cept a Rule 23(b) eleven-juror verdict after a juror was excused to cele1
brate a religious holiday.

06

mencement of deliberations, even though the defendant requested their discharge. Id. at 950. In Hayutin, the trial judge separately sequestered three
alternates after the jury retired to consider its verdict. Id. The judge ordered that
they be brought back every time the jury comes in to ask a question or for any
other reason. Id. Separate marshals were assigned for the regular and alternate
jurors. Id. The court noted that "[n]owhere does it appear that they ate in the
same restaurant, rode in the same conveyance, or slept in the same hotel." Id.
The Second Circuit, in Hayutin, admonished the district court's retention of
the alternates because Rule 24(c) mandates the discharge of alternates at the outset of deliberations and retention of alternates without a clear benefit may result in
prejudice. Id. The Second Circuit recognized that Rule 24(c)'s provision providing for the discharge of alternate jurors is mandatory. Id. A danger exists that a
defendant runs the risk of having his guilt determined by the 12 jurors and an
additional three alternates. Id. The Hayutin court stated "[t] he absence of benefit
being so clear and the danger of prejudice so great, it seems foolhardy to depart
from the command of Rule 24." Id. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit did not reverse the district court's error because the act of retaining alternates did not prejudice the defendant. Id. The Hayutin court found that the alternates were not in a
position to influence the jury during deliberations. Id. They were separately sequestered and commanded not to talk with the regularjurors. Id. Thus, the court
held that the defendants were not prejudiced by the presence of the alternates. Id.
The Second Circuit expanded its Hayutin holding in 1983 when it decided
United States v. Hillard. 701 F.2d at 1057. As in Hayutin, the trial judge separately
sequestered two alternates during the jury's deliberations, but allowed the alternates to join the jury whenever it returned to the courtroom to hear testimony or
instructions. Id. at 1055. In Hillard, the trial court then substituted an alternate
juror for a regular juror who became ill after the jury had deliberated for two and
one-half days and a subsequent three day holiday recess. Id. at 1054-55. The defense refused to stipulate to an l1-memberjury and objected to a one-day adjournment in case the ill juror became well. Id. at 1055. The trial judge refused to
declare a mistrial because it would be a waste of judicial resources. Id. The court
decided to replace the ill juror with one of the alternates. Id. Each alternate was
interviewed by the judge. Id. The jurors admitted to discussing the case generally
with each other. Id. In fact, the first alternate admitted he had formed a preliminary opinion, but believed he could fairly deliberate with the regular jurors. Id.
Nevertheless, the judge permitted the substitution. Id. The trial judge then instructed the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations "from scratch." Id.
The Second Circuit, in Hillard, concluded that this post-submission substitution did not prejudice the defendant and preserved "the essential feature of the
jury" because, among other things, the judge instructed the reconstituted jury to
start deliberations anew and the jury's "verdict was the product of the thought and
mutual deliberation" of all 12 jurors. Id. at 1057. The Hillard court supported
their holding by explaining that alternates were chosen in the same manner as the
regular jurors and heard all the evidence and instructions that the regular jurors
heard. Id. Additionally, the alternate indicated he could fairly deliberate, and the
judge ordered the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew. Id. Finally, the
Second Circuit opined that the length of deliberation for the reconstituted jury
reflected that the defendant suffered no prejudice. Id.
105. 779 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1985).
106. Id. at 831-35. In United States v. Stratton, a juror informed the trial court
before the commencement of deliberations that she had to leave early because of
upcomingJewish holiday of Succoth. Id. at 830. The judge recommended than an
alternate be substituted before deliberations begin, but the defense counsel ob-
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Similar to the Second and Fifth Circuits, the Third Circuit has favored
Rule 23(b)'s eleven-juror verdicts rather than substituting alternate jurors.' 0 7 In United States v. Gambino,10 8 for example, the Third Circuit
found that a district judge did not abuse his discretion when proceeding
with Rule 23(b)'s eleven-juror verdict.10 9 In fact, the Third Circuit
seemed to disapprove of the possibility of a post-submission substitution
procedure which is "explicitly disfavored as a remedial device by the Rules
1 10
Committee that studied and revised Rule 23(b).
C.

IntermediateApproach: Condemning Sit-In Procedures, But Allowing
Substitution Wen Alternate Is Absent from PreviousDeliberations

The Fourth and Tenth Circuits have adopted an intermediate approach to post-submission juror substitutions holding that post-submission
substitutions with an alternate who has already witnessed prior deliberations is a greater danger to the defendant than continuing with an alternate juror who was not exposed to the prior deliberations. 1 1' For
jected to the substitution. Id. After deliberations began, the juror had to be excused because of the holiday. Id. at 831. If the judge waited for the juror to
return, the deliberations would be halted for four and a half days. Id. The judge
decided to follow Rule 23(b) and proceed with only 11 jurors, despite defense
counsel's request to adjourn until the juror returned from her holiday. Id. Thereafter, the 11 jurors returned a guilty verdict later that day. Id.
The Second Circuit agreed with the trial judge's decision to proceed with an
11-juror verdict. Id. The court noted that Rule 23(b) was designed for these type
of dilemmas and "provide[s] a preferred mechanism for avoiding a mistrial." Id.
Further, the court recognized that post-submission substitutions poses problems.
Id. The court stated "[e]ven though the jurors will be instructed to disregard previous deliberations upon empaneling of an alternate, they may not be able to nullify the effect of past discussions." Id.
107. See United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 948-49 (3d Cir. 1986) (expressing preference for 11-member jury over post-submission substitution).
108. 788 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1986).
109. Id. at 948-49. In Gambino, the judge separately sequestered two alternate
jurors. Id. at 947. After 20 hours of deliberation, the judge was informed that two
jurors had seen unauthorized exhibits. Id. Only one juror had actually viewed a
document that could be considered prejudicial to the defendant. Id. Both the
government and the defense attorneys asked the trial court to replace the original
juror with an alternate juror. Id. The court refused to substitute the alternate
because in the trial judge's view Rule 23(b) mandated that he proceed with only 11
jurors. Id. Thereafter, the remaining 11 jurors rendered a guilty verdict the same
day. Id.
The Third Circuit, in Gambino, found that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion when he opted for an 11-member jury. Id. 948-49. The Gambino court
reviewed the reasons behind the 1983 amendments to Rules 23(b) and 24(c) and

concluded that the Rules Committee amended the rules to avoid post-submission
substitution dilemmas. Id. The Gambino court furthered observed that the trial
judge clearly violated Rule 24(c) by separately sequestering the two alternates after
deliberations began. Id. at 948. The defendants, however, did not allege error in
violation of Rule 24(c) on appeal. Id.
110. Id. at 949.
111. For a discussion concerning the Fourth and Tenth Circuits' post-submission substitution procedures, see infra notes 112-18 notes and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss4/9

26

Baker: Criminal Law - Post-Submission Juror Substitution in the Third Ci

1996]

CASEBRIEF

1239

example, the Fourth Circuit has held that a reversible error exists when
alternate jurors attend prior deliberations before being substituted.1 12 A
reversible error is present even when defense counsel consents to allowing
an alternate juror in the jury room during deliberations if the defendant
can prove that prejudice resulted from the trial court's deviation from
Rule 24(c)'s mandate to discharge alternates at the beginning of deliberations. 113 Contrastingly, the Fourth Circuit allowed the substitution of a
112. See United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 870-73 (4th
Cir. 1964) (holding that allowing presence of alternate in jury room is reversible
error). In Virginia Erection, the Fourth Circuit overturned a jury verdict because
the defendant did not personally consent to the substitution, and the sanctity of
the jury's deliberations was violated by allowing an alternate juror to witness the
original jury's deliberations. Id. at 870-73. Before deliberations, one of the original jurors said she felt ill, but was well enough to continue for the present time. Id.
at 869. The court was worried about the possibility of a mistrial, so it permitted an
alternate to retire with the jury in case the original juror became too ill. Id. at 86970. Although the record seemed to indicate that counsel for both parties agreed
to the alternate's presence, the record does not show that the defendant personally accepted the decision. Id. at 870. The Fourth Circuit opined that there was no
way to know if the alternate obeyed the judge's instructions to be remain silent
during deliberations. Id. at 872. The court commented: "However, if he heeded
the letter of the court's instructions and remained orally mute throughout, it is
entirely possible that his attitude, conveyed by facial expressions, gestures or the
like, may have had some effect upon the decision of one or more jurors." Id. The
court concluded that "the presence of the alternate in the jury room violated the
cardinal principle that the deliberations of the jury shall remain private and secret
in every case." Id. The Fourth Circuit feared that the alternate's presence may
have acted as a restraint upon the jurors and their ability to express their views. Id.
113. United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978). In Chatman, the court held that reversible error is present even when defense counsel
consents to allowing an alternate juror in the jury room during deliberations. Id.
at 1361-62. A thirteenth juror, who was not excused, retired with the regular jurors. Id. at 1361. She remained with the jury for 45 minutes before this mistake
was discovered. Id. When the alternate was excused, neither side moved for a
mistrial. Id. There was also no evidentiary inquiry to learn whether the alternate

juror participated with the jury during deliberations. Id. After the alternate was
excused, the jury returned a verdict within 15 minutes. Id. The Fourth Circuit
ruled that the consent of counsel did not matter because the alternate's mere presence was plain error. Id. Reversal was required because of the lack of the defendant's consent to the procedure, the presence of the alternate in violation of 24(c)
and the possible effects on jury privacy and secrecy. Id.
According to the Supreme Court, however, this rule of reversible error is not a
per se rule. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737-41 (1993). The Supreme
Court held that the presence of alternate jurors in the deliberating room did not
substantially affect the rights of the defendant, although the trial court's decision

was a plain error. Id. The Court held that there is not a presumption of prejudice
when a juror sits in deliberations and is told not to participate. Id. Although, if

the defendant can show that he or she was prejudiced by an alternate juror's presence, than a reversal may be in order. Id. Appellate courts continue to find de-

fendants prejudiced by the presence of alternates in the jury room. See, e.g., U.S. v.
Ottersburg, 73 F.3d 137, 140 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that presence of two alternates in deliberation room required reversal of conviction because defendant's
substantial rights violated). Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's holdings have only
been modified by this recent development. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit's holding
in United States v. Beasley, is only modified by the Olano case. Compare United States

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 9

1240

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41: p. 1213

discharged alternate juror who was not present during earlier deliberations because the defendant knowingly and intelligently consented to the
substitution, and any prejudicial effect was eliminated by the alternate's
absence during previous deliberations.' 14 Thus, it appears that the Fourth
Circuit believes that proceeding with an alternate juror previously discharged prior to deliberations endangers the impartiality of the jury more
11 5
than continuing with an alternate not exposed to prior deliberations.
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has adopted the Fourth Circuit's intermediate approach towards the presence of alternates during the deliberation
process. 116 The Tenth Circuit holds that an alternate's presence in the
v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972), with Olano, 507 U.S. at 725. For a discussion of Beasley and the Tenth Circuit's view of sit-in procedures, see infra notes 11617 and accompanying text.
114. United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1980). In Evans, the
Fourth Circuit allowed the substitution of a discharged alternate juror who was not
present during earlier deliberations. Id. at 1128. One of the regular jurors informed the judge that he had overheard a discussion between outsiders about the
defendant. Id. at 1126. The judge decided to remove the juror. Id.
The court distinguished this case from VirginiaErection, 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir.
1964) and Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978) by demonstrating that the defendant knowingly and intelligently consented to the substitution, and any prejudicial effect was eliminated by the alternate's absence during previous deliberations.
Evans, 635 F.2d at 1127-28. The Fourth Circuit found this post-submission substitution to be fundamentally fair. Id. A defendant should have the ability to knowingly choose to proceed with the alternate or declare a mistrial. Id. The
defendant is in a superior position to know what is best for him, not the judge. Id.
In fact, the court gave the defendant the option of proceeding under Rule
23(b) with the 11 remaining jurors or insisting upon a mistrial, but contrary to his
defense counsel's advice, the defendant opted to substitute the alternatejuror. Id.
at 1126-27. The court questioned the juror on her ability to render a fair decision,
and she responded that she could be impartial. Id. at 1127. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that "the twelve member jury as ultimately constituted was the intelligent, preferred choice of the defendant himself, and that implicitly the defendant
had made clear his preference to it over ajury made up of only the original eleven
members still remaining." Id. The defendant's counsel informed the defendant
about the possible adverse effect of anything the alternate juror may have heard
after being discharged. Id. at 1127 n.3. The defendant consciously chose to proceed with the alternate. Id.
115. Evans, 635 F.2d at 1128. The Fourth Circuit distinguished the holdings
in Virginia Erection and Chatman, from this case. Id. at 1128 n.5 (distinguishing
Virginia Erection, 335 F.2d at 868; Chatman, 584 F.2d at 1358). In Virginia Erection
and Chatman, the Fourth Circuit found the presence of an alternate in the deliberation room was highly prejudicial for three reasons: (1) there was no personal
consent of the defendant; (2) the presence of a thirteenth juror violated the Federal Rules maximum of twelve jurors and; and (3) the presence of the thirteenth
juror presented a possibility of impermissible coercion. Id.
In Evans, none of these concerns were present in the Fourth Circuit's opinion.
Id. The defendant knowingly consented to the substitution and there was never
more than 12 jurors deliberating at one time. Id. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
held that the presence of an alternate juror in the original jurors' deliberation
process was more prejudicial than separately sequestering the alternate and then
placing the alternate into a reconstituted jury. Id.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Baccari, 489 F.2d 274, 275 (10th Cir. 1973) (allowing post-submission substitution because defendant consented); United States
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jury room after the jury retires is grounds for a mistrial. 117 The Tenth
Circuit, however, will uphold the substitution of an alternate juror not
present during earlier deliberations if a defendant and his or her counsel
11 8
stipulate to the substitution.
When faced with the post-submission substitution of ajuror in contradiction of Rule 24(c), most circuits seem willing to improvise their own
procedures in an attempt to sidestep the Federal Rules of Criminal Procev. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 470-71 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding presence of alternate in
jury room while jurors deliberate is grounds for mistrial).
117. Beasley, 464 F.2d at 470-71. In Beasley, the Tenth Circuit was faced with a
thirteenth juror because an alternate juror was inadvertently allowed to witness the
jury's deliberations. Id. at 469. The alternate retired with the 12 original jurors,
voted with the jury to select a foreperson and even voted to go to lunch. Id. After
about 20 minutes, the trial judge realized he forgot to discharge the alternate after
the jury retired. Id. Immediately, the judge advised the attorneys about the problem. Id. A motion for a mistrial was made, but the judge denied it after holding a
brief hearing to determine the extent that the alternate participated. Id.
The Tenth Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit's approach in Virginia Erection
and concluded that the privacy and sanctity of the deliberation process was violated and thus the presence of the alternate juror was grounds for a mistrial. Id.
(citing VirginiaErection, 335 F.2d at 868). In the Tenth Circuit's view, once the jury
retires it should only consist of the prescribed number ofjurors. Id. Once deliberations begin, the alternate is like any other stranger to the proceeding because
Rule 24(c) mandates the discharge of alternates. Id. The Tenth Circuit opined
that the prejudice standard is unworkable in these situations because it is difficult
to know what impact the alternate had on the deliberation process. Id. at 469-70.
Simply put, the Tenth Circuit found that the alternate's "presence destroys the
sanctity of the jury and a mistrial is necessary." Id. at 470.
118. Baccari, 489 F.2d at 274. In Baccari, the Tenth Circuit was confronted
with the same situation found in the Fourth Circuit's Evans decision. Id. at 275
(discussing Evans, 635 F.2d at 1124). Similar to the court in Evans, the Baccari
court allowed the post-submission substitution of an alternate juror. Baccari, 489
F.2d at 275. Here, the alternate was discharged pursuant to Rule 24(c) at the close
of both attorneys' arguments. Id. After the original jurors began deliberations,
one of the jurors became ill and had to be hospitalized. Id. Then both parties
agreed to call back the alternate to continue deliberations. Id. Each defendant
and their counsel agreed to this plan for the record. Id.
The defendants argued that the post-submission procedure was unconstitutional, so their assent to it could not cure this defect. Id. The defense relied on
the Fourth Circuit's holding in Virginia Erection, arguing that a per se rule of reversal applies to this case. Id. (Virginia Erection, 335 F.2d at 868). The Baccari court
distinguished the Virginia Erection holding for two reasons. Id. First, a thirteenth
juror situation did not arise here since the alternate was discharged and then recalled to become part of the 12-member jury. Id. Second, both the defendants and
their counsel consented to the substitution, unlike in Virginia Erection, where there
was no showing that the defendants had personally consented to the additional
juror. Id. The Tenth Circuit concluded that substitution would have been improper and grounds for a new trial if the defendants did not consent, but here the
defendants knowingly waived any objection to this procedure. Id.
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Baccaridecision when rendering its opinion
in Evans. Evans, 635 F.2d at 1128 n.5. The Evans court commented that in Baccari
the Tenth Circuit upheld the post-submission substitution of an alternate because
the defendant knowingly consented to the procedure and a thirteenth juror dilemma was not present because the alternate was not present for the previous deliberations before being impaneled. Id.
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dure. 1 9 Liberal circuits rely mostly on the prejudice standard for reversal
and the clear stipulation and waiver among the parties to evade Rule
24(c). 120 Recently, the Third Circuit in Claudioapproached a post-submis1 21
sion substitution dilemma in a similar fashion.
IV.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO POST-SUBMISSION SUBSTITUTION:

CLA

A.

IOO v. Savz &_i?

FactualBackground

In Claudio, the Third Circuit for the first time addressed the constitu122
tionality of substituting an alternate juror after beginning deliberations.
A Delaware district court replaced an ill juror with an alternate after deliberations began, but did not officially instruct the jury to restart deliberations. 123 The reconstituted jury then deliberated and found both
defendants guilty on all counts.1 24 The defendants argued that this procedure violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial
because the substitution of alternates after deliberation had started violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) 125
At the start of the defendant's state trial, the trial judge read his instructions to the jury and the three alternate jurors and then separately
119. For a discussion of how circuits improvise their own post-submission substitution procedures to work around Rule 24(c), see supra notes 79-118 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of methods such as the prejudice standard and the stipulation of the parties, see supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
121. See Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1577 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1329 (1996) (allowing post-submission substitution of alternate juror because "essential feature" of jury trial was not compromised).
122. Id. at 1573-74. The Third Circuit decided to hear this case because the
constitutionality of the trial court's decision to substitute an alternate juror after
deliberations begin presented a question of first impression in this circuit. Id. at
1574.
123. Id. Instead of instructing the jury to begin deliberations anew, the trial
judge told the reconstituted jury to "take whatever time is necessary" to inform the
replacement juror of all previous deliberations. Id.
124. Id. at 1575. The reconstituted jury convicted the defendants of first degree robbery, four counts of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission
of a felony, two counts of first degree conspiracy, and one count each of first degree murder and first degree attempted murder. Id. at 1573.
125. Id. at 1575. The defendants argued that the trial court erred by substituting an alternate after deliberations began. Id. at 1573-74. The defendants also

argued that the trial court erred in two other ways. Id. First, the defendants
claimed that the trial court erred by failing to issue a curative instruction to remedy inflammatory remarks made by the prosecutor after some physical evidence
was excluded. Id. Second, the defendants argued that the state court erred by
instructing the jury on accomplice liability in a way that would lead the jurors to
believe that the defendants bore the burden of proof on that issue. Id. at 1574.
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief on all
three grounds but elaborated only on the post-submission substitution claim. Id.
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sequestered the three alternates during deliberations. 126 After the first
day of deliberations, one of the regular jurors became ill and the next
12 7
morning the trial judge replaced the ill juror with one of the alternates.
The defense counsel moved for a mistrial, but the trial judge denied the
motion.1 28 The judge instructed the original eleven jurors to "take
whatever time is necessary, even though it may be repetitious and time
consuming, to completely update [the alternate juror] as to the stage of
deliberations you as a group have reached."1 29 Thejudge then specifically
instructed the alternate juror to take as much time as necessary to acquaint herself with the thinking of the other jurors and to proceed with
deliberations once she fully understood the case. 130 The reconstituted
jury deliberated for approximately nine and one-half hours, while the orig13 1
inal jury deliberated for about six and one-half hours.
126. Id. at 1574. On December 1, 1987, the jury began its deliberations at
approximately 10:30 a.m. and deliberated until 5:00 p.m. Id. When the jury requested to view the defendant, Claudio, the court agreed, but required the three
alternates to be present with the original 12 jurors to view Claudio. Id. After the
first day of deliberations, the jury could not reach a verdict. Id. The trial judge
sequestered the original jurors for the night and separately sequestered the alternates. Id. The trial judge separately sequestered the alternates to the end of the
trial because the original jury came back with a guilty verdict, the defendants

would have to be present in a post-verdict hearing on the issue of capital punishment. Id. at 1574 n.2.
127. Id. at 1574. One of the original jurors became ill during the night, so
the trial judge excused the ill juror and replaced the juror with one of the alternates. Id. Before impaneling the alternate, the trial judge asked the three alternates whether they read anything about the case. Id. All three alternates told the
judge that they had not read anything about the trial. Id. Then the trial judge
impaneled the first alternate. Id.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Md The trial judge's instructions to the alternate read in pertinent part:
You find yourself [sic] somewhat of a disadvantage. Fortunately however,
with your diligence and the cooperation of your fellow jurors, you will be

able to familiarize yourself with the deliberations concluded thus far, so
that you are not at any disadvantage with regard to understanding all of
the evidence and the views of your fellowjurors. It is essential and critical
that you take whatever time is necessary to familiarize yourself with the
evidence and the thinking and views of the jurors. You must guard
against the natural feeling to rush or hasten in order to keep up with the
majority or the other 11. I instruct you to be conscious, and forthright in
telling the others if you feel at a disadvantage with regard to the level of
your understanding. When and only when you feel yourself adequately
and reasonably equipped to understand what has transpired thus far in
the deliberations, should you signal to your fellow jurors your desire to
move forward.
Id. at 1574 n. 3. (citing Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1284 n.9 (Del. 1991)).
131. Id. at 1575. The jury found the defendants guilty on all counts. Id. The
defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
for first degree murder, life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for attempted murder and an additional 45 years for other offenses. Id.
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On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the trial
court violated Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 24(c),132 which is
identical to the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), but concluded
that the substitution of the alternate juror was a harmless error. 133 The
federal district court declined to review the defendant's petition for
habeas corpus relief, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
constitutional challenge to this
Circuit decided to hear the defendant's
1 34
post-submission substitution procedure.
B.

The Third Circuit's Analysis

The Third Circuit relied on the federal precedent developed by its
fellow circuits because the constitutionality of the post-submission procedure presented a question of first impression.13 5 In upholding the constitutionality of the post-submission procedure, the Third Circuit adopted
the two approaches developed by the other circuits: (1) the "essential feature of the jury test" and (2) the prejudice standard for reversal. 136 The
Third Circuit held that the substitution of the alternate juror did not com132.
provides:

DEL. SUPER.

CT. CRuM. R. 24(c). Superior Court Criminal Rule 24(c)

Alternate Jurors. The Court may direct that not more than 4 jurors in
addition to the regular jury be called and impanelled to sit as alternate
jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace
jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties.
Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same
qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges,
shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regularjurors. An alternate juror who does not
replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.
Id.
133. Claudio,585 A.2d at 1289. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that
"the violation of the federal Constitution in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
134. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1574. The defendants obtained jurisdiction in the
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) after the defendants exhausted all
their state court remedies. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1574. The defendants appealed to
the Third Circuit Court on a certificate of probable cause issued pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2253. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1574.
135. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1574-77. The Third Circuit recognized that the
Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of post-submission substitutions. Id. at 1575.
136. Id. at 1575-77. The Third Circuit commented:
Most of the federal courts that have addressed the issue, however, have
held that when circumstances require, substitution of an alternate juror
in place of a regular juror after deliberations have begun does not violate
the Constitution, so long as the judge instructs the reconstituted jury to
begin its deliberations anew and the defendant is not prejudiced by the
substitution."
Id. at 1575.
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promise an "essential feature" of a trial by jury and thus did not prejudice
13 7
the defendant.
In order to preserve the "essential feature of a jury trial," the Third
Circuit recognized the need to preserve the sanctity of the deliberative
process. 138 While acknowledging the defendant's fears that post-submission substitution may disrupt the sanctity of the jury, the Third Circuit
rejected this argument in favor of the liberal approach.13 9 The Third Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits, holding that these concerns are
nullified when the judge instructs the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew. 140 Therefore, the court held that the defendant is not
41
prejudiced by this post-submission substitution.1
The Third Circuit cited cases from almost every circuit to support the
constitutionality of post-submission substitutions. 142 The court noted that
both the Ninth Circuit in Miller and the Eleventh Circuit in Peek recognize
that the "essential feature" of the jury is preserved in post-submission substitution cases by procedural precautions that guard against violations of
143
the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments rights.
137. Id. at 1577. The Third Circuit concluded "[b]ecause the trial court's
instructions were the functional equivalent of an instruction to 'begin anew,' we
find no evidence that the substitution of the alternate juror compromised the 'essential feature' of a trial by jury." Id.
138. Id. at 1575. The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Williams
v. Foridasummarized the essential feature of a jury trial as providing the defendant with the right to be tried by his peers and safeguarding against the "corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge." Id.
(citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)).
139. Id. at 1575-77. The Third Circuit recognized that the defendants feared
that the introduction of an alternate juror after the commencement of jury deliberations violates "the sanctity of the deliberative process." Id. at 1575. The defendants argued that "the introduction of an alternate juror after deliberations had
begun vitiated the essential purpose of the jury by disrupting the community participation and shared responsibility that the Supreme Court deemed essential." Id.
140. Id. at 1577. The Third Circuit found that the trial court's instruction was
"functionally equivalent" to "begin anew" instruction. Id. Based on this finding,
the Third Circuit relied on the majority of other circuits to conclude the sanctity of
the deliberation process had been preserved. Id.
141. Id. at 1575. The Third Circuit recognized that most federal courts allow
post-submission substitution when the defendant is not prejudiced by the procedure and the reconstituted jury is instructed to begin deliberations anew. Id. For a
discussion of other circuits' approach towards post-submission substitution, see
supra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
142. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1575-76. See, e.g., United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d
446, 448 (lth Cir. 1987) (allowing post-submission substitution); Miller v.
Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (same); United States v.
Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d
1052, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d 1124, 112728 (4th Cir. 1980) (same). But, the Third Circuit relied mostly on opinions in the
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits when rendering its opinion. Claudio,68 F.3d
at 1575-76.
143. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1576. The Third Circuit emphasized that the courts
in both Peek and Miller allowed the substitution of one or more alternates after jury
deliberations began. Id. (distinguishing Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir.
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The Third Circuit further acknowledged that the trial court did vio-

late Rule 24(c) of the Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rules, but concluded that federal case law makes it clear that a violation of an
established criminal procedure is not sufficient in itself to create a violation of the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to ajury
trial. 1 " In support of this position, the Third Circuit relied on the Second
Circuit's ruling in Hillardwhich held a trial court's violation of Rule 24(c)
was not constitutionally objectionable because of the in-depth procedural

precautions taken by the judge to preserve the "essential feature" of the
jury.1

45

The Third Circuit acknowledged that the trial judge never explic-

1986) (en banc); Miller, 757 F.2d at 988). The Third Circuit recognized that in
Miller, the Ninth Circuit allowed the substitution of alternate jurors because the
court's improvised post-submission procedure "preserved the 'essential feature' of
the jury." Id. (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 100; Miller, 757 F.2d at 995); see also
Grunat, supra note 1, at 879 (illustrating inherently coercive effects that arise from
post-submission substitution). For a further discussion of the holdings of Peek and
Miller, see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
144. Claudio, 68 F.3d 1576. The Third Circuit recognized that "[a]nalogous
federal cases make clear that a violation of the established criminal procedure is
not sufficient in itself to create a constitutional violation." Id. The Third Circuit
opined "despite the characterization of Rule 24(c) as 'a mandatory requirement
that should be scrupulously followed,' federal courts have generally ruled that the
substitution of a juror after deliberations have begun does not violate the United
States Constitution, provided the defendants suffered no prejudice as a result." Id.
145. Id. at 1576-77. In Hillard,the Second Circuit upheld the post-submission
substitution of an alternate in direct violation of Rule 24(c). Hillard,701 F.2d at
1056-57. The Hillard Court allowed this post-submission substitution because the
essential feature of the jury was preserved by procedural precautions taken by the
judge. Id. In Hillard,the alternate was chosen by the same procedures as the regular jurors, heard all the same evidence as the regular jurors and reaffirmed his
ability to consider the evidence impartially. Id. Therefore, even though a criminal
rule of procedure was violated, the Second Circuit held that the defendant was not
prejudiced because of these procedural precautions. Id. Likewise, the Third Circuit held the defendant in Claudio was not prejudiced because similar precautions
were taken. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1577. For a further discussion of Hillard,see supra
note 104 and accompanying text.
Similar to the Hillardholding in the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit could
find no prejudice that would elevate a violation of Rule 24(c) to a violation of the
United States Constitution. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1577. The Third Circuit opined
that proper procedural precautions were taken to guard against prejudicing the
defendant. Id. The alternates were chosen by the same procedures as the regular
jurors and heard all of the same evidence as the regular jurors. Id. In addition,
the alternate juror explained that she had not discussed the case or been exposed
to media coverage. Id. Also, the trial judge instructed the original jurors to "take
whatever time is necessary" to completely bring the alternate juror up to date and
directed the alternate to take as much time as necessary to familiarize herself with
the evidence and the views of the jurors. Id.
The Third Circuit, however, failed to mention the Second Circuit's decision
in United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1985), which affirmed a
trial judge's decision to accept a Rule 23(b) ljuror verdict. This decision casts
doubt on whether post-submission substitutions are permissible in the Second Circuit after Rule 23(b)'s amendments. Id. For a further discussion concerning the
impact of the Stratton case on the Second Circuit, see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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itly told the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew, but held the
instructions were the functional equivalent of telling the jury to restart
deliberations. 146 The court concluded by opining "t]he words 'begin
anew' carry no talismanic power, and we would exalt form over substance
were we to ignore the salutary effect of the trial court's instructions in this
case."
V.

14 7

POST-SUBMISSION SUBSTITUTION IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT-SERVING

JUDICIAL ECONOMY WHILE UNDERMINING A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY

The Third Circuit's holding in Claudio follows the liberal trend of allowing for improvised procedures that evade Rule 24(c)'s prohibition
against post-submission substitution ofjurors.1 48 Clearly, the circuits have
implemented these improvised procedures in an attempt to promote judicial economy.1 4 9 The circuits' improvised procedures may guard against
the possibility of costly mistrials, but the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce146. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1577. The Third Circuit opined that the judge's instructions were the functional equivalent of directing the jury to begin deliberations again because "[t]he instructions were designed to eliminate any
disadvantage that the alternate juror may have felt as a result of her late introduction into the deliberations and to ensure her full, effective, and uncoerced participation in all aspects of the deliberations." Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1575-77. For a further discussion of other circuit's precedent allowing for post-submission substitution procedures, see supra notes 79-121 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit correctly recognized that in order to preserve
the essential feature of a jury trial, the court must protect the sanctity of the deliberative process by guarding against external influences. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1575.
Similar to the Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the Third Circuit believes the
sanctity of the jury is protected by procedural precautions such as instructing the
reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew, sequestering the alternate jurors
separately at the beginning of the original deliberations, questioning the alternate's ability to begin deliberation with an open mind and directing the alternate
jurors to familiarize themselves with the evidence and the views of the original
jurors. Id. at 1575-77.
In Claudio, the defendants believed that the judge's instructions did not adequately protect their rights. Id. at 1573-74. Unlike most of the post-submission
substitution cases found in other circuits, here the trial judge did not specifically
instruct the reconstituted jury to restart deliberations, but directed them to "take
whatever time necessary before beginning deliberations again." Id. at 1574. The
Third Circuit held that these instructions were the "functional equivalent" of such
an instruction because they were designed to eliminate any of the disadvantages
the alternate may experience. Id. at 1577.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (lth Cir. 1987)
(holding post-submission substitution is justifiable when long and complex trial);
United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1061 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that postsubmission substitution is better alternative than mistrial and promotes elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay); Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175, 179
(7th Cir. 1980) (viewing post-submission substitution as way of dealing with difficult and unforeseeable circumstances); United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565, 573
(S.D. Fla. 1979) (finding post-submission substitution provides opportunity to preserve fair trial while avoiding another trial).
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dure already provide the necessary safeguards against the substantial expenditure of resources by the prosecution, defense and court. 150 By
following the post-submission substitution precedent set by other circuits,
the Third Circuit has joined these circuits in undermining a defendant's
right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth
15
Amendments. 1
A.

Compromising the Deliberation Process

Post-submission substitution ofjurors after the beginning of deliberations infringes upon the sanctity and privacy of the deliberation process. 152 The Supreme Court has held that protecting the privacy and
secrecy of jury deliberations is essential to preserve the "essential feature"
of a trial by jury. 15 3 Courts ensure this privacy by keeping the jurors free

54
from external influences such as family, friends, news and all outsiders.'

150. See FED. R. CaM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 297301 (1983) (providing necessary safeguards against mistrials in post-submission
substitution dilemmas). The advisory committee recommended amending Rule
23(b) to allow for 11-memberjuries in case one of the jurors became incapacitated
after deliberations began, rather than amending Rule 24 to allow for post-submission substitutions. Id. The committee found post-submission substitutions to be
constitutionally objectionable. Id. at 301. On the other hand, the committee
found 11-memberjuries as a way to prevent a costly mistrial and stop the expendi-

ture of substantial prosecution, defense and court resources. Id. at 298. The committee commented that:
The amendment provides that if a juror is excused after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, it is within the discretion of the court
whether to declare a mistrial or permit deliberations to continue with 11

jurors. If the trial has been brief and not much would be lost by retrial,
the court might well conclude that the unusual step of allowing a jury
verdict by less than 12 jurors absent stipulation should not be taken. On
the other hand, if the trial has been protracted the court is more likely to

opt for continuing with the remaining 11 jurors.
Id. at 301.
151. For a discussion of reasons why post-submission substitution endangers a
defendant's right to a fair trial, see infra notes 152-78 and accompanying text.
152. See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978) (arguing that presence ofjuror would violate privacy and secrecy ofjury deliberations);
United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 469 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding presence of
alternate endangers sanctity of jury); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335
F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding presence of alternate injury room violated
cardinal principle that deliberation ofjury shall remain private and secret); see also
Grunat, supra note 1, at 876-77 (arguing that sanctity of jury is violated by postsubmission substitutions).
153. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (commenting that "essential feature" ofjury is promoted by "group deliberation, free from outside attempts
at intimidation. . . provid[ing] a fair possibility for obtaining a representatives
cross-section of the community").
154. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (mandating need for jury privacy free from
outside influence); Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377, 382 (1956) (holding
sanctity of jury violated by outside intrusions such as bribes). For a discussion of
the importance of preserving the privacy and secrecy of deliberations, see supra
notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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Rule 24(c) mandates the discharge of alternate jurors "after the jury retires to consider its verdict." 155 Once these alternate jurors are dis156
charged, they are considered outsiders to the deliberation process.
An alternate's subsequent presence in the deliberation room dissolves
the jury's sanctity, especially if the alternate has had contact with the
outside world. 157 In United States v. Virginia Erection Corp.,1 5 8 the Fourth
Circuit noted that even the silent alternate may convey messages to the
15 9
deliberating jurors through "facial expressions, gestures or the like."
Therefore, an alternate's presence after jury deliberations begin may improperly influence the jury's verdict and prejudice the defendant's right
to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
An alternate placed into a jury after deliberations begin undermines
the group dynamics involved in the deliberative process. 160 When an alternate juror enters deliberations, he or she is forced into a coercive atmosphere. 16 1 Both federal courts and the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure recognize that this coercive atmosphere may pressure
the alternate to prematurely agree with the original jurors.1 62 Also, alter155. FED. R. CruM. P. 24(c). For a further discussion of the purpose of Rule
24(c), see supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
156. See Grunat, supra note 1, at 876-77 (commenting that alternate is outsider to deliberations and violates jury's privacy); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)
(mandating discharge of alternate jurors at beginning of deliberations). Because
Rule 24(c) requires that alternate jurors be discharged at the outset of deliberations, it logically follows that these alternates are outsiders who may come into
contact with a number of corruptive influences. Grunat, supra note 1, at 876-77.
157. See FED. R.CruM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 245, 301
(1983) (commenting that even if reconstituted jury was required to begin deliberations anew, "the continuing jurors would be influenced by the earlier deliberations
and ...the new juror would be somewhat intimidated by the others by virtue of
being a newcomer to the deliberations"); see also United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d
1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1975) (commenting that alternate loses obligation as juror
and confidentiality once released by court).
158. 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964).
159. Id. at 872. For a further discussion of Virginia Erection, see supra note 112
and accompanying text.
160. See 3 ORFIELD, supra note 27, at 94 (discussing how original drafters of

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure feared that regular jurors would cause sole
dissenter to quit, causing replacement of alternate who could easily be swayed); see
also HASTIE ET AL., supra note 51, at 121 (discussing importance of group dynamics
in deliberation process); Grunat, supra note 1, at 879-80 (discussing how post-submission substitution undermines group dynamics by interfering with jury's ability
to reach group consensus).
161. See Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156 (discussing possible coercive effects on alternatejuror who joins jury after deliberations begin). For a discussion of studies that
illustrate the difficulty an alternate experiences when trying to change the opinions of the original jurors, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
162. See Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156 (commenting "[tihe inherent coercive effect
upon an alternate juror who joins a jury that has, as in this case, already agreed
that the accused is guilt is substantial"); United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 469
(10th Cir. 1972) (discussing possible prejudice to defendant from alternate's presence); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 301
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nates miss part of the crucial deliberation process because they participate
163
only in part of the deliberations.
Post-submission substitution also undermines the possibility of a hung
164
jury and thus decreases the defendant's chances of obtaining a mistrial.
Commentators and social scientists believe that post-submission substitution may cause jurors in favor of conviction to influence the sole juror in
favor of acquittal to feign illness and thus place the burden of the decision
on a more impressionable alternatejuror. 165 In the Eleventh Circuit decision Peek v. Kemp,' 66 the jury sentenced the defendant to death within
minutes after an alternate was replaced because he allegedly became sick
two hours into deliberations. 167 The judge did not question the ill juror
before discharging him, but later fact-finding efforts revealed that the sick
juror was the lone hold-out for acquittal.' 68 Similarly, in the Ninth Circuit
decision United States v. Lamb, 169 a reconstituted jury rendered a verdict in
170
twenty-nine minutes, while taking four hours before the substitution.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision because the newjuror was placed

(discussing coercive atmosphere present when alternate joins jury after deliberations begin).
163. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) (mandating discharge of alternate once deliberations begin). If alternates miss a crucial part of the deliberation process, it may
hinder their ability to deliberate fairly.
164. See Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156 (discussing how post-submission substitution
significantly limits accused's right to mistrial in case when original jury cannot
reach agreement); McDermott, supra note 1,at 881 (same). McDermott describes
how post-submission substitution may decrease the likelihood of a hung jury in two
ways. Id. First, if ajury wants to ensure a verdict, it may pressure a sole dissenter
out of the jury. Id. Second, "studies demonstrate that hung juries are more likely

when a lone dissenter, supporting the defendant, receives support for his or her
position early in deliberations." Id. at n.367 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 1, 462-63 (1966)). The Supreme Court commented
that this study is "the most ambitious empirical study ofjury behavior that has been
attempted." Grunat, supra note 1, at 881 n.143 (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554, 575 (1967)).
165. See ORFIELD, supra note 163, at 94 (discussing how regular jurors may
pressure one dissenter to quit); see also Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156 (commenting that
"[a] lone juror who could not in good conscience vote for conviction could be
under great pressure to feign illness or incapacity so as to place the burden of
decision on an alternate juror"). For a further discussion of studies revealing the
pressure of an alternate when he or she enters reconstituted jury, see supranotes
53-54 and accompanying text.
166. 784 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
167. Id. at 1482. For a further discussion of the facts of Peek and the Eleventh
Circuit's holding, see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
168. Peek, 784 F.2d at 1482.
169. 529 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1975).
170. Id. at 1155. For a further discussion of the facts of Lamb and the Ninth
Circuit's holding, see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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into a coercive atmosphere in which the jury had already reached a
verdict. 171
Like the judge in Peek, the trial judge in Claudio did not question the
ill juror but merely excused him. 172 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit approved of this post-submission procedure and found that a coercive atmosphere did not exist.17 3 The Third Circuit reaffirmed its belief that the
alternate juror participated in an uncoerced atmosphere because the reconstituted jury deliberated for slightly longer than the originally impaneled jury, and the judge instructed the reconstituted jury "to take whatever
time necessary." 174 This fact alone does not remove the possibility of coercion. 175 It is possible that the ill juror was also a lone hold-out who was
176
pressured into feigning illness.
If courts refuse to follow the uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure
promulgated by the Supreme Court, then a constant danger exists that a
defendant's substantial right to a trial by an impartial jury will be undermined. 177 Even though the tactic of separately sequestering the alternate
juror before impaneling him or her to the reconstituted jury may help
171. Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156-57. The Lamb Court concluded "[t]hat impermissible coercion upon the alternate juror in this case was manifestly inherent." Id. at
1156.
172. Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1574 (3d Cir. 1995). Many other circuits make a point of discussing how the trial judge usually will question the disabled juror before allowing him or her to be excused. For a discussion of cases
where trial judges interview the incapacitated juror, see supra notes 79-121 and
accompanying text.
173. Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1577. The Third Circuit argued that the judge's instructions to the reconstituted jury ensured the alternate's full, effective and uncoerced participation in the deliberation process. Id.
174. Id. In Claudio, the original jury deliberated for about six and one-half
hours, while the reconstituted jury deliberated for about nine and one-half hours.
Id. at 1575. For a further discussion of the facts of Claudio including the judge's
instructions to the jury, see supra notes 122-34 and accompanying text.
175. See Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1157 (opining that despite judge's instruction to
"begin at the beginning," the alternate juror was coerced into agreeing with original jurors). In Lamb, the Ninth Circuit commented that the 29-minute deliberation period of the reconstituted jury was not a factor in reversing the district
court's holding. Id. at 1156 n.7. The Ninth Circuit opined that "[t]he mandatory
provision of Rule 24 having been violated, the period of time during which the

substitute juror participated in the deliberations is essentially irrelevant." Id.
176. See Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1482 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (discussing how subsequent fact findings showed that replaced juror was lone holdout
for acquittal). For a further discussion of the facts and court's analysis in Peek, see
supra note 92 and accompanying text.
177. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 2 (stating that Federal Rules are meant to secure
simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration). Therefore, Rules 23(c)
and 24(b) were enacted to promote fair deliberations on behalf of the defendant.
By creating improvised post-submission substitution procedures, courts are violating Rule 24(c) and undermining the "fairness and simplicity goals" of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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preserve the jury's secrecy, the Third Circuit's abandonment of Rules
1 78
23(b) and 24(c) may have compromised the jury's secrecy.
B.

Denying Supreme Court Approval of Rule 23(b)'s Procedural Option

The Third Circuit's improvised post-submission substitution procedure also undermines the intent of the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court to
preserve a defendant's right to an impartial jury. 179 The Supreme Court
has twice rejected proposals to amend 24(c) to allow for post-submission
substitutions in favor of 23(b)'s procedural solution.18 0 In 1983, the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court and the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice amended 23(b) to permit an elevenjuror verdict at the
discretion of a trial judge, rather than accept a post-submission substitution amendment to 24(c). 181
When ajudge is faced with the loss of a juror during deliberations, a
viable 23(b) option exists that already has Supreme Court approval.18 2 It
is difficult to understand why the circuits continue to use improvised postsubmission substitution procedures and risk compromising a defendant's
right to an impartial jury when 23(b)'s eleven-member jury verdict provides the perfect solution.18 3 Both the Fifth and Second Circuits recommend that trial judges proceed with Rule 23(b)'s eleven-juror verdict
178. See Claudio, 68 F.3d at 1574 (observing trial court's separate sequestering
of alternate jurors). The Third Circuit believes the sanctity of the jury is protected
by procedural precautions such as instructing the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew, sequestering the alternate jurors separately at the beginning of the
original deliberations, questioning the alternate's ability to begin deliberation with
an open mind and directing the alternate jurors to familiarize themselves with the
evidence and the views of the original jurors. Id. 1575-77. Many of the other circuits believe that these same procedural precautions guard against violations of the
jury's sanctity and preserve the "essential feature" of the jury. For a discussion of
the procedural precautions that circuits employ, see supra notes 79-121 and accompanying text. For a discussion of why courts should use the 23(b) option, see infra
notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of why the drafters, advisory committee and Supreme
Court did not favor post-submission substitution procedures, see supra notes 56-71
and accompanying text.
180. See FED. R. CruM. P. 23(b) advisory committee notes, 97 F.R.D. 245 (adoption of Rule 23(b) by Supreme Court, rather than Rule 24's post-submission substitution proposal); Orfield, Trial Jurors, supra note 4 at 46 (commenting that
Supreme Court questioned constitutionality of post-submission substitution procedure). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's indirect disapproval of
post-submission substitution, see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the views of the Advisory Committee, Supreme Court
and the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice, see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
182. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 23(b) (providing I1-member jury in discretion of
judge when juror is lost after beginning of deliberations).

183. For a discussion regarding the circuits' improvised post-submission substitution procedures, see supra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
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rather than rely on improvised post-submission procedures.18 4 Even the
Third Circuit in Gambino favored Rule 23(b)'s eleven-juror verdict rather
than deviate from Rule 24(c)'s directives.18 5
In Claudio, however, the trial judge never gave the defendant the option of proceeding with an eleven member jury. 18 6 The Third Circuit
never addressed the 23(b) eleven-juror option in their opinion, except to
acknowledge in a footnote that it was not considered. 18 7 Rather than permit improvised post-submission substitution in direct contradiction to
Rule 24(c), the Third Circuit should have directed the trial court to proceed with a discretionary eleven-member jury pursuant to Rule 23(b).1 88
This approach would not have the potentially damaging effect on a defendant's substantial rights because no danger exists of an alternate juror
disturbing the sanctity and impartiality of the jury.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the Third Circuit's improvised post-submission substitution
procedure may promote judicial economy, 189 it undermines an "essential
feature" of the jury process and may possibly prejudice a defendant. 190
The Third Circuit has set a dangerous precedent by following the improvised post-submission substitution procedures set forth by its fellow circuits. 19 1 Attorneys must be aware that this holding increases the risk that
the sanctity and impartiality of jury deliberations may be compromised
and decreases the probability of a hung jury and a defendant's chances of
obtaining a mistrial. 192 Therefore, attorneys must approach these postsubmission substitution problems strategically. If attorneys find that the
184. For a discussion of the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits views on postsubmission substitutions, see supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
185. United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 948-49 (3d Cir. 1992). For a
discussion of the Gambino opinion, see supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
186. Claudio v. Synder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1575 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995). The trial court
never asked the parties whether they wanted to accept the unanimous verdict of 11
jurors pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Rule 23(b). Id.
187. Id. If the parties agreed to an 11-member jury verdict, the whole problem would have been resolved. Id.
188. FED. R. CiIM. P. 23(b). If the Third Circuit supported a ll-memberjury
verdict, there would be no danger of compromising the sanctity of the jury because
courts would then follow Rule 24(c)'s mandate to discharge alternates at the outset of deliberations. FED. R. CrIM. P. 24(c).
189. For a discussion of how post-submission substitution serves judicial economy, see supra note 149 and accompanying text.
190. For a discussion of how post-submission substitution procedures undermine the sanctity and impartiality of the jury, see supra notes 152-78 and accompanying text.
191. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit followed federal precedent, see
supra notes 135-95 and accompanying text. For a discussion of other circuits' approach towards post-submission substitution, see supra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
192. For a discussion of how post-submission substitution may endanger the
sanctity of the jury, see supra notes 46-55, 152-78 and accompanying text.
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post-submission substitution may prejudice their client, they should bring
Rule 23(b)'s discretionary eleven-member jury procedure to the court's
193
attention.
Rule 23(b)'s eleven-member jury is clearly a better alternative because
19 4
no outside influences threaten the sanctity and impartiality of the jury.
Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court rules differently, courts in the
Third Circuit will follow Claudio and continue to violate Rule 24(c)'s
mandatory language and thus continue to endanger a defendant's right to
19 5
a trial by an impartial jury.
Jeffrey T. Baker
193. FED. R. CuM. P. 23(b).
194. For a discussion of the promulgation of Rule 23(b) and why it is a better
alternative than Rule 24(c), see supra notes 56-71, 179-88 and accompanying text.
195. See Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1575 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing how
Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on constitutionality of post-submission
substitutions).
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